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N RECENT suits for injuries from defective products, plaintiffs have
alleged a great variety of dangerous defects, and where negligence is
involved, many different kinds of careless conduct. In many of these suits,
however, the complaint has been that the product was not accompanied
either by adequate directions for use, or by sufficient warning of dangers
which might arise during some foreseeable handling of the product. The
advent of strict liability in many jurisdictions has not checked this trend,
for even where negligence is not required, it still is necessary to allege de-
fectiveness, and what often makes a product defective and unreasonably
dangerous is the lack of adequate warnings or directions for use.1 This
Article will concern the increased requirements in recent years with ref-
erence to warnings and directions, both in negligence and strict liability
cases. To place this development in the proper setting the present state of
general products law will be briefly indicated.
I. RECENT GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
It would be difficult to find an area of law expanding as rapidly as that
relating to consumer protection from defective products. One aspect of
this expansion relates to "strict liability." After a period of doubt as to
whether negligence could be dispensed with in products cases, an increas-
ing number of jurisdictions have decided to accept the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts'" view that proof of negligence should not be required in
the situation described in section 402A.' Under that section a manufac-
turer or other person in the business of selling who permits a product to
leave his hands in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
consumer or user" may be liable to remote users even though he has used
"all possible care" in its preparation and sale.
* A.B., LL.B., Harvard University; M.A., Columbia University. Alumni Professor of Law,
University of Tennessee. This study has been assisted by a faculty research grant from the Uni-
versity of Tennessee.
'The latest comprehensive article on this matter was written in 1955, and deals only with
negligence. Dillard & Hart, Products Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty To Warn, 41 VA.
L. REV. 145 (1955). This outstanding Article has been cited in hundreds of decisions.
'2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A, 402B (1965).
' Some of the decisions most recently expressing approval of the Restatement view are: O.S.
Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248 (Ariz. App. 1968); Rosignol v. Danbury School of Aeronau-
tics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967); Dealer's Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co.,
402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488
(1967); State Stove Mfg. Corp. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
912 (1967); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Olney v. Beaman Bottling Co.,
220 Tenn. 459, 418 S.W.2d 430 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d
240 (1966); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Shamrock Fuel &
Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1966); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967); cf. Schenfeld v. Norton Co., 391 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1968) (applying
Colorado law).
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It should not be hastily concluded, however, that negligence is no longer
significant in a products case. Negligence concepts are firmly embedded in
the minds of judges and lawyers, and while the Restatement dispenses with
proof of negligence, it still requires that the product be "unreasonably
dangerous" as well as defective. In the determination of what is unreason-
ably dangerous, the negligence rules doubtless will have considerable
effect.'
Furthermore, most complaints in products cases still contain a specific
negligence count, along with a strict liability claim. One reason for this is
that both courts and juries are apt to regard substantial damages as more
appropriate when evidence of actual carelessness can be produced. A sec-
ond reason is that strict liability has been mainly restricted to users or
consumers of the product.' Although users are broadly defined in the
Restatement to include such persons as a passenger in a car, or even an
employee making repairs' on the vehicle, the American Law Institute was
unwilling to impose strict liability to a mere bystander, such as a pedes-
trian struck by a defective vehicle. A few decisions have gone beyond the
Restatement and allowed non-users to recover under strict liability prin-
ciples,' but generally a non-user can not count on recovery unless he can
establish negligence. Where negligence is established, liability extends not
only to users and consumers of the product but to anyone the defendant
"should expect to be endangered by its probable use."' Thirdly, where the
manufacturer of a component part is involved, negligence liability is
clear,' while strict liability of the component part manufacturer still is
doubtful."° Thus, the negligence count reaches more defendants, protects
more plaintiffs, and is apt to lead to a more substantial recovery.
Where it is claimed simply that an individual item was carelessly con-
structed, the negligence most frequently alleged is inadequate inspection or
testing.1 ' Sometimes, however, the plaintiff claims that the product when
made as intended is defective and hazardous. It is in this area that the
more recent negligence developments have occurred.
When the plaintiff undertakes to show that the defendant's product as a
whole creates an unreasonable risk of injury, the negligence asserted or-
dinarily relates to the basic design of the product, or to inadequate warn-
ings or directions for use." Such cases have been increasingly successful,
'See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13, 25 (1965).
5 See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) os TORTS § 402A (1965).
'See id. § 402A, comment 1, caveat (1).
'Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965); Piercefield v.
Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965). But cf. Kuschy v. Norris, 25
Conn. Supp. 383, 206 A.2d 275 (Super. Ct. 1964).
'2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
9See id. § 395, comment m.
"Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1963); 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment q (1965).
"See, e.g., Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942) (failure to inspect com-
ponent part in chair); Singleton v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 131 So. 2d 329, 332 (La. App.
1961) (failure to inspect shells); Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932)
(inadequate sampling of bottles); Marsh Wood Prods. Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209,
240 N.W. 392 (1932) (failure to make microscopic examination of steel used for boiler tube;
inspection not customary, but nevertheless needed).
'2 1 L. FRUMER & W. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 7-8 (Supp. 1968) [hereinafter cited
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but many courts still hesitate to allow juries to pass on designs prepared
by experts, particularly when the purchaser can choose between different
designs, and when an adverse verdict will affect a product already exten-
sively manufactured. This reluctance is illustrated in Evans v. General
Motors Corp.," involving a Chevrolet station wagon designed with an "X"
frame without protective side rails in case of a side impact collision. Other
cars were advertised as having safer perimeter frames with side rails. It
was alleged that because of the absence of a perimeter frame, the side of
the station wagon collapsed inward when struck by another car, with re-
sulting fatal injuries to the driver. A divided court held that the duty of
the manufacturer was simply to make a product reasonably fit for its in-
tended purpose, and that "the intended purpose of an automobile does not
include participation in collisions with other objects.""
Of course a collision is not an "intended use" of an automobile, but
between a fourth and two-thirds of all automobiles are at some time in-
volved in a collision producing injury or death;" collisions are incident to
an expectable use of automobiles. While the main function of the automo-
bile is to provide efficient transportation, manufacturers stress safety and
comfort as well. It has been shown in recent years that safety involves not
only a design which will help prevent collisions, but one that will provide
protection from the second collision, when passengers are thrown about
after the original impact."
The decision in the Evans case was influenced by automobile safety leg-
islation then pending,'7 although, as the dissenting judge observed, "the
possibility of future adequate legislative standards does not remove the
necessity of deciding whether plaintiffs should or should not have an op-
portunity to prove the allegations made in the complaint."' 8 There remains,
however, the consideration that legislative and administrative regulation
may provide the better remedy. An administrative agency, after extensive
and impartial research, can understand engineering complexities better
than a jury, and can better balance against safety the other interests such
as economy, style, and performance. Administrative regulation also has the
considerable advantage of taking effect before the motor vehicle or other
product is manufactured. It also provides a more uniform standard as to
what is needed for reasonable safety than can be achieved through diverse
judicial decisions. Doubtless these considerations influenced the court in
the Evans case, and numerous other courts reluctant to let juries pass on
the safety of a particular automobile design.' One recent case, however,
as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN]; Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use, 71
YALE L.J. 816 (1962); Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instruc-
tions or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965).
"3359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966) (applying Indiana law).
'
4 1d. at 825.
"O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, S8 Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 348 (1963).
"a Nader, Automobile Design: Evidence Catching up with the Law, 42 DENVER L.J. 32 (1965);
Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 645, 655 (1967).T See 80 HARv. L. REv. 688 (1967); 42 NOTRE DAME LAw. 111 (1966).
"SEvans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 828 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836
(1966).
'"See Muncy v. General Motors Corp., 367 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1037 (1967) (no duty to avoid designing ignition system so key could be removed without turning
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clearly asserts that a car manufacturer has a common law duty to design
his product safely, and in such a way as to minimize the effect of acci-
dents.2"
Now that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 196621
has been enacted, what effect will a failure to comply with the Act have on
suits based on negligence of design? The Act requires the Secretary of
Transportation to establish minimum safety standards for all new motor
vehicles, and initial standards have been issued. 2 The Act further provides
civil penalties for violation of the standards, up to a thousand dollars for
each offense, but does not indicate whether or not a violation gives rise
to a private cause of action.
Generally, where a statute is designed to protect a certain class of per-
sons from a particular hazard, violation of the Act constitutes negligence
as a matter of law, or at least is evidence of negligence. It is an evident
purpose of the new Act to protect the occupants of motor vehicles from
both the original collision and from the so-called "second collision" (when
the occupants are thrown about after the impact). Consequently, the
courts will probably implement the Act by finding that violation of the
Act or of the safety standards set by the Secretary of Transportation con-
stitutes at least evidence of actionable negligence. Such a holding would
not involve giving power to juries to pass on the safety of complicated
designs, nor would it place any retroactive burden on manufacturers.
This does not mean, conversely, that where a design feature alleged to
be essential for safety but not yet required by regulations issued under the
Act is involved, the case should always be dismissed." As in related situa-
tions the plaintiff should be permitted to prove common law negligence,
off motor and taking unbraked car out of gear) (case decided same way in state court, 357
S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)); Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966)
(no duty to design a safer hood latch); Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311
(S.D. Ohio 1967) (applying Ohio law) (Corvair burst into flames after collision; no duty to
make car safe when involved in collisions); Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 266 F. Supp. 115
(D. Neb. 1967) (applying Nebraska law) (cutting potential of vent window which injured
plaintiff bending down near car; danger obvious and no unreasonable risk); Willis v. Chrysler
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (applying Texas law) (no duty to avoid making car
which would break into two sections on impact); Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 261 F. Supp.
134 (S.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968)
(applying Indiana law) (no duty to refrain from making cars of excessive horsepower and speed);
Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (applying Texas law) (bicycle rider
collided with sharp fin of parked car); Drummond v. General Motors Corp., CCH PRODS. LIAB.
REP. 5 5611 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles, Cal., 1966) (design of Corvair suspension system); Mc-
Nally v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 128, 284 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (no duty
to install device to signal loss of brake fluid).
" Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying Minnesota law)
(duty to use due care to design steering shaft to avoid rearward displacement of column, or to
warn of the danger). See also Badorek v. Rodgers (Cal. Super. Ct., June 16, 1967), discussed in
11 PERSONAL INJURY NEWSLETTER 93, 220 (1968).
21 15 U.S.C.A. S§ 1381-1425 (Supp. 1966).
21d.; 32 Fed. Reg., No. 23, Part II (Feb. 3, 1967). Some of these standards have been with-
drawn. See, e.g., 32 Fed. Reg. 11776 (1967).
2'W. PROSSER, TORTS § 35, at 202 (3d ed. 1964); Comment, Products Liability Based on
Violation of Statutory Standards, 64 MrcH. L. REV. 1388 (1966).
SLarsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying Minnesota' law);
Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945) (use of warning label approved by
Surgeon General for carbon tetrachloride did not preclude finding that warning was inadequate);
James, The Untoward Effect of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflectiosns on Enterprise Liability,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550, 1554 (1966).
1969]
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for when due care requires a particular safety feature, courts and juries
should be able to supplement the standards set up by legislation." To re-
move any doubt about this matter, it is expressly provided in the Act
that compliance with any safety standard issued under the Act "does not
exempt any person from liability under the common law.""
While the courts are reluctant to let a jury declare unsafe a design pre-
pared by experts, there are other situations in which a jury must pass on
the work of specialists, such as where the conflicting claims of medical
witnesses are weighed. The fact that a design is "hallowed by a brand
name and a corporate shield" should not protect the defendant where the
plaintiff secures substantial expert testimony that the design is unsafe."7
Likewise even though a decision that a particular design is unsafe may lead
to a multiplicity of suits, this is not adequate grounds for letting plaintiffs
suffer their losses, for widespread injury should lead to widespread liability.
Furthermore, the basic concept of the new Act is that the manufacturer
should assume responsibility for safety of design, not only to avoid colli-
sions, but to protect passengers from further injury after the collision,
and even to protect persons from injury while the vehicle is not in opera-
tion. 8 Legislative adoption of this general concept should encourage courts
to recognize a common law responsibility to use due care in these areas, as
well as in the process of construction. Judges distrustful of design suits,
however, still may be reluctant to give much weight to the express state-
ment that the Act is not intended to exempt any person from liability
under the common law, and may continue to hold that a design feature
which has escaped regulation under the national Act is not unreasonably
dangerous."9
II. ADVANTAGES OF BASING CASE ON INADEQUATE
DIRECTIONS OR WARNINGS
Aware of the difficulties in establishing design negligence, plaintiffs
have turned with increasing frequency to allegations of inadequate direc-
tions for use, or insufficient warning of dangers which may arise if direc-
tions are not closely followed or if the product is used differently from the
way intended. A case along these lines can be established without the
difficulty and expense of securing expert testimony, or of preserving the
physical evidence needed to establish a design defect. Such evidence may
be difficult to secure since the product often is so badly damaged that it
cannot be reconstructed. Additionally, prescribed accident reports stress
the human element in accident causation, and provide little help as to de-
fects in the vehicle which may have played a part in the accident."0 In
any event, it is easier for the jury to understand the need for better direc-
"
5 See Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 930 (1967).
28IS U.S.C.A. § 1397 (Supp. 1966).
8TSee Nader & Page, supra note 16, at 663.
'National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1391(l) (Supp.
1966).
" See Note, Effect of the Automobile Safety Act on Automobile Manufacturer's Duty of
Design, 21 Sw. L.J. 332 (1967).
3ONader & Page, supra note 16, at 666.
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tions and warnings than to understand the deficiencies of some complex
design, particularly when the testimony is by experts who know more
about technical matters than about explaining things to laymen."'
Sometimes the problem in establishing design negligence results from
the fact that the manufacturer is a foreign one over whom it is difficult to
secure jurisdiction. In this situation it may be possible, where the suit is
based on inadequate directions or warnings, to secure jurisdiction over a
local party, such as the dealer, on the ground that he should have discov-
ered these inadequacies and supplemented the directions or warnings or
corrected the defect.32
Where it is complained that directions or warnings are inadequate, such
deficiencies ordinarily can be corrected by more careful labeling or adver-
tising. Consequently, an adverse verdict is far less serious to the defendant
than in a design case, and there is not the same judicial reluctance to let
the case go to the jury.
Once the plaintiff establishes a breach of duty to warn or to give ade-
quate directions, he has overcome the problem of showing that the pro-
duct was defective at the time it left the manufacturer's hands. A plaintiff
often is unable to get to the jury because the defect which caused the acci-
dent may be due to alteration or misuse of an originally sound product.
Where, however, it is shown that the defendant failed to give adequate in-
structions or warnings, it ordinarily is clear that the accident cannot be
attributed to intervening factors. Furthermore, where a duty to warn
against the use to which plaintiff has put the product is established, the
plaintiff has gone far toward defeating the defense of unusual or careless
use of the product.
Attorneys for manufacturers and other suppliers, as well as those for
plaintiffs, should give special attention to the matter of warnings and di-
rections for use, for this is an area where clients can be advised how to
avoid accidents and resulting suits. While lawyers do not know enough
about product engineering to suggest the need for a safer basic design,
they can determine that a particular set of directions or warnings on lab-
els, leaflets, or advertising matter fails to measure up to the standards of
clarity or intensity required under court decisions. People immersed in the
manufacture or distribution of a product, and thoroughly familiar with
its characteristics, may attribute more knowledge and awareness of risk
to consumers than in fact exists. The use of time and imagination by at-
torneys in advising a manufacturer or retailer how to make directions and
warnings more effective may forestall an injury, and the resulting litiga-
tion.
" So where a plane crashed when the pilots were asphixiated by carbon dioxide in the cockpit,
it was easier to establish a duty to warn of a need for masks than to establish negligence of design.
See DeVito v. United Airlines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951) (applying New York law),
discussed at note 33 infra, and accompanying text.
'McKinney v. Frodsham, 57 Wash. 2d 126, 356 P.2d 100 (1960), involving defectively de-
signed door latch on a car. Likewise where a car made by an English company had a gas tank in
the trunk, with no vents through which vapor could escape, the local distributor was liable for
failure to discover and warn of this defect. Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir.
1961) (applying Alabama law).
1969]
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III. PRODUCTS DANGEROUS EVEN WITH WARNING
There are cases, however, where the manufacturer probably would have
been negligent even had a warning been given. In DeVito v. United Air-
lines, Inc.,' a Douglas DC-6 aircraft crashed in good weather, with loss
of forty-three lives. The manufacturer had previously discovered that
during fire fighting or fire testing operations carbon dioxide gas was apt
to filter into the habitable parts of the plane when the gas was discharged
into the baggage compartments. It also was learned from a medical re-
port that any considerable concentration of carbon dioxide tended to
drive out needed oxygen and cause unconsciousness. Just before this plane
crashed carbon dioxide had been discharged into the forward baggage
compartment. The jury concluded that gas had entered the cockpit and
rendered both pilots incapable of controlling the plane. The manufacturer
was found liable because of failure to warn the airline of this danger, and
of the need to use full oxygen masks after the release of carbon dioxide
into any fuselage compartment. It is likely, however, that there was a
duty not simply to warn of this danger but to correct the design which
permitted such a hazardous concentration of gas in the cockpit."
A comparable case involved a baby bathinette with supports made of
magnesium alloy. If the supports caught fire, water used to extinguish the
fire would release inflammable hydrogen, which in turn would produce an
intense emission of bluish flames. In this case the flames shot far enough
to burn the plaintiff in another room. The court sustained a directed ver-
dict on the ground that the bathinette was not dangerous in its ordinary
use." Judge Frank, dissenting, thought that a household fire was fore-
seeable and that the purchaser should have been warned that "the presence
of the bathinette could easily transform an ordinary house or apartment
into a fire trap." He then remarked, "To comprehend the nature of de-
fendants' negligence, one has but to ask whether defendants could have
sold their bathinettes, if there had ben affixed an easily-readable notice
saying, 'If fire happens in your home, this bathinette will probably in-
crease the dangers greatly, because the magnesium may ignite, causing
unusual spurts of flame which will be peculiarly difficult to extinguish.'""
The answer to this inquiry by Judge Frank is that the bathinette consti-
tuted an unreasonable hazard and should not have been sold, with or
without adequate warning. The basic negligence lies in the use of an un-
duly inflammable material in a product designed for use in the home. A
warning would not correct this defect.'7
"398 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951) (applying New York law).
"See also Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951) (dangerous con-
centration of carbon monoxide gas in a refrigerator).
' Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
923 (1955) (applying Michigan law).
3"Id. at I11.
,7 The point is further illustrated by an evening gown made with highly inflammable nitro-
cellulose sizing. Such a dress is likely to be worn where smoking is to be expected, and is hazardous
even with an appropriate warning. In two New York cases, where the wearer of the dress was
suddenly enveloped in flames, the manufacturer was found liable. In neither case was a warning
given, but since the dress was not intended for use in places where smoking would be unlikely, a
warning would not seem sufficient to protect from liability for using a hazardous design. Dayton
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It may be found that a product is defective and unreasonably danger-
ous under strict liability principles, as well as on negligence grounds, even
when accompanied by a warning. Such a decision involved a jacket found
to be highly inflammable. A child of five was severely burned when a
spark from a schoolyard fire around which he and some other children
were playing started an uncontrollable fire in the jacket. A jury finding
that the garment was defective and unreasonably dangerous within the
meaning of the Restatement8 was sustained.8 There was no warning in
this case that the jacket was inflammable, and had not been treated with
flame retardant, but the opinion is based chiefly on the consideration that
highly inflammable materials should not be used in a garment prepared
for a child, who foreseeably might play with or around a fire. The court
emphasized that a flame retardant would have added only a few cents to
the cost of the jacket, with no impairment of usefulness, and the decision
probably would have been the same notwithstanding a warning statement
that the fabric had not been treated with an adequate flame retardant.'
IV. DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIRECTIONS FOR USE AND WARNINGS
A distinction should be made between the duty to give adequate direc-
tions for use and the duty to warn. ' Sometimes a manufacturer will point
out after an accident that had the plaintiff followed the directions given
for use of the product, no harm would have occurred. The difficulty with
this defense is that the user of a product often regards the directions as
intended simply to secure the efficient use of the product, and fails to re-
alize that some minor departure from these directions may create a serious
danger. Where that is the case, an additional duty to warn of the danger
may arise.' So in a case involving heat blocks designed to help revive in-
jured persons, the court indicated that giving instructions to wrap the
blocks in insulating material before use did not relieve the manufacturer
of the duty to warn of the danger of serious burns if insulation was not
used. The opinion states, "the instructions, not particularly stressed, do not
amount to a warning of the risk at all, and . . .it was foreseeable that the
small print instructions might never be read and might be disregarded
even if read."'
v. Harlene Frocks, Inc., 274 App. Div. 1015, 86 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 609, 86
N.E.2d 176 (1949); Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944),
aff'd, 294 N.Y. 680, 60 N.E.2d 839 (1945).
882 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1964).
a LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (applying Pennsylvania law).
"°A different sort of case involved a crop-dusting chemical designed to kill plants with broad
leaves appearing in rice fields. The dust drifted to cotton fields and damaged plaintiff's broadleafed
cotton. The manufacturer had circulated a warning of the risk of damaging cotton and other
broadleafed crops. He nevertheless was held liable, without proof of negligence, for engaging in
what was found to be an ultra-hazardous enterprise. Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark.
630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949). It may well be that this dust, assuming it had a tendency, even
on a calm day, to drift long distances and damage crops, would be regarded as defective and un-
reasonably dangerous under the strict liability view even though accompanied by a warning. Like
an automobile without a bumper or seat belts, it probably should not be placed on the market.
41 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 8.05(1).
'McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953); Dillard
& Hart, suPra note 1, at 147.
'McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 69, 181 N.E.2d 430, 434, 226
1969]
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In some cases liability can be based simply on failure to give adequate
directions for use, as where there are no directions to lubricate a safety
ratchet to prevent its deterioration," or where the purchaser of a hay baler
is directed to re-engage twine with moving rollers in a manner which is
hazardous." This is in accord with the Restatement" which indicates a
duty not only to use due care to design a product safely, but to attach di-
rections adequate to insure its safe use. Moreover, even though the pur-
chaser has been made aware of danger, liability may result because of fail-
ure to give the user of the product adequate instructions on how to avoid
the peril to which he has been alerted; 47 and where the risk of injury from
failure to follow directions is grave, the directions for use may be inade-
quate unless placed on the product itself, or upon the container. 8
V. WHEN DUTY To WARN ARISES UNDER NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLES
If there were an obligation to warn against all injuries that conceivably
might result from the use or misuse of a product, manufacturers would
find it practically impossible to market their goods. On the other hand,
the complexity of modern chemical and mechanical products has increased
the possibilities of harm to unsophisticated users. In the balancing of these
considerations, however, it is becoming apparent that the duty to warn,
like the duty to avoid a defective design, is being expanded.
The basic duty to warn under negligence principles was set forth in the
Restatement of Torts" and is reaffirmed with minor changes in the new
revision." In negligence cases, three factors are of special importance in
N.Y.S.2d 407, 412 (1962). See also Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E.
639 (1930) (inflammable combs; liability for failure to warn, even though instructions not fol-
lowed). In Panther Oil & Grease Mfg. Co. v. Segerstrom, 224 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1955) (applying
Washington law) there were directions not to heat a "roof primer" because this would damage
its waterproofing qualities. When the plaintiff applied heat, this caused an explosion. The court
found that the instructions, directed toward utility, did not dispense with the need to warn of
danger from heating the product.
"'Jackson v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Co., 252 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (applying
Pennsylvania law). Likewise failure to give any instructions as to installation of a propane gas
system, where faulty installation creates serious hazard may be a basis for liability. Cracknell v.
Fisher Governor Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 857, 56 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1967).
4 See Wichman v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 117 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (applying
Missouri law), reesd on other grounds, 220 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1955) (applying Missouri law),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955).
"2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 397, comment b (1965).
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS S 28.7 n.2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as HARPER
& JAMES].
4See I R. HUsHs, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.36 (Supp. 1968); 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 397, comment b (1965).
'*2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 388 (1934).
"2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). The revised language is:
Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use
is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel
with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical
harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person
for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) Knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous
for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will
realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition
or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
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determining the existence of a duty to warn. First, how likely is an acci-
dent to occur when the product is put to a more or less expectable use;
second, if an accident does occur, how serious an injury is likely to result;
and third, how feasible is it to give an effective warning?5'
The balancing of these factors may be illustrated by the case where an
oil company furnished science teachers a display consisting of a set of oil
samples." The company had placed water in the bottle marked kerosene, to
make the display more mailable, avoid discoloration, and increase safety.
Unfortunately, a teacher used fluid from the bottle labeled kerosene to
illustrate how metallic sodium is preserved by kerosene. When the water
came into contact with the sodium a serious explosion resulted. In permit-
ting the jury to find a duty to warn, the court weighed the gravity of
the possible harm against the practicality of a warning, observing that it
"would have been so easy to have warned" of the inaccurate labeling. If
the harm from a possible accident had been less serious, perhaps no duty
to warn would have been found, since the chances of the water being used
for this experiment were remote.
It sometimes is urged by the manufacturer that the product involved a
hazard of which he was unaware. The duty to warn arises, however, not
only when the manufacturer actually knows about the danger, but also
when he "has reason to know" of it." The plaintiff sometimes is aided by a
presumption that the manufacturer knows the nature and ingredients of
his product." Furthermore the manufacturer may be under a duty to test
the materials and parts from which his product is made, particularly
where a defect may result in grave injury."
Where a new product is involved, it may be necessary to test the safety
of its use in different parts of the country. So in one case a new insecticide
was safely useable in the northern area where it was manufactured and
tested, but proved hazardous to crops in a southern climate, where it had
not been tested. Liability was imposed for failure to warn of the localized
danger, which could have been discovered by more widespread testing.
A special problem arises as to drugs in their clinical stages. It often is
necessary to test new drugs on human subjects as well as on animals before
they can be approved as safe for general marketing. In that connection
it may be desirable, from a scientific angle, to say very little either to the
doctor who administers the drug or to the patient who takes it, in order
"1 See Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1961) (applying New York
law). See also Judge L. Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947).
" Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939) (applying New York law); see also
Wagner v. Larsen, 257 Iowa 1202, 136 N.W.2d 312 (1965) (jury question as to whether manu-
facturer and dealer should have warned owner of danger in improperly starting a silo unloader
after it became stuck).
5 See Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964), second appeal, 249 Cal.
App. 2d 822, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967); 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388(a) (1965).
"'Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 220 Mass. 593, 108 N.E. 474 (1915); 1 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN § 12.01(1).
'2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395, comment e (1965); 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN
8.01; 1 R. HURSH, supra note 48, § 2.22.
5 6
McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953); Dillard
& Hart, supra note 1, at 147.
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to secure more objective evaluations. It would seem, however, that the
manufacturer should have a duty to communicate to the doctor, and in-
directly to the patient, a warning that the drug is untested, and that its
use may involve unknown hazards. Where a specific serious danger is sus-
pected, the doctor and the patient should be advised at least of the serious-
ness of the risk, if not of its precise nature. It has been said by a leading
physician that "however desirous [the practitioner] may be of learning, of
making progress, or of doing something for the common good, [he] must
not yield to the temptation to 'sell' his proposal and thus acquire the
necessary authorization."" If the doctor has an ethical duty to warn the
patient of hazards, it would seem equally clear that the manufacturer has
a duty to transfer to the doctor whatever information is needed to give
this warning.
There still are cases where the defendant is excused from liability on
negligence grounds because the danger is unknown. So it was found that
the manufacturer of a weed killer was not bound to know of the danger
from skin absorption, in the absence of previous injuries of this kind. 9 It
is evident, however, that manufacturers are being held to keep abreast of
scientific advances." Thus, in a case"' involving a chemical used to kill
weeds and brush, the manufacturer was found liable for an unusual sort
of injury. The product had been used to kill willow trees along a drainage
ditch which adjoined the plaintiff's pasture. When it was sprayed on the
trees it left on the leaves a salty residue which made the leaves attractive
to cattle. It further appeared that as the willows died, a considerable
amount of nitrate had been drawn into their leaves from the soil. The
plaintiff's registered Herefords ate large quantities of the leaves and died
of nitrate poisoning.
It was urged that this risk was unknown to the defendant, and not
reasonably foreseeable. The court held, however, that the jury could find
a foreseeable risk. Consequently, there was a duty to warn of this danger,
at least where the product itself had been labeled as "not hazardous to live-
stock"; as a result of failure to so warn, the cattle were not removed from
the field. While this risk was not in fact foreseen, the court observed that
"in manufacturing and distributing chemical weedkillers, DuPont is held
to the skill of an expert, is charged with superior knowledge of the nature
and qualities of its products, and is obligated reasonably to keep abreast
of scientific information, discoveries, and advances with respect thereto.""2
If in this case the danger were known only to a few scientists, the man-
ufacturer probably could not be found negligent in failing to warn of a
" Ayd, Medical Tribune, Sept. 17, 1962, at 12, as quoted in Rheingold, Products Liability-
The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 947, 958 n.59 (1964).
"8See Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS
L. REV. 947, 958 (1964).
5 Hunter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 170 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (applying
Missouri law).
0 1 R. HURSH, supra note 48, § 2.29.
eLaPlant v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. App. 1961).
' Id. at 240. See also Gonzales v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 239 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C.
1965) (applying South Carolina law); 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.4, at 1541.
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risk of which he was justifiably ignorant; judgment for the plaintiff
would then have to be based on strict liability principles.
VI. WHEN A DUTY To WARN ARISES UNDER
STRICT LIABILITY PRINCIPLES
With many courts adopting the principles of strict liability, the issue
arises as to when a product is "defective and unreasonably dangerous"
under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts"' because not
accompanied by adequate warnings or directions. It is said in a comment
to the Restatement that "to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the
container, as to its use." This duty probably is similar to that arising
under negligence law, for while "foreseeability is a standard used to de-
termine fault, . . . it is also an important factor in determining the appli-
cability of section 402A,"' when the defectiveness and unreasonable dan-
ger of the product for a particular use is being considered.
Since it is also provided in section 402A that a seller incurs liability even
though he has exercised "all possible care, '  presumably the duty to warn
may arise even though there is no sufficient foreseeability of harm to give
rise to such a duty under negligence principles; that is, a lesser degree of
risk may be enough to establish a duty to give warnings or directions
under strict liability rules. For example, in a recent case" involving Type
III oral Sabin polio vaccine, the fact that this drug caused polio in a
minute proportion of users, less than one in a million persons, did not
preclude the product from being defective and unreasonably dangerous
under strict liability principles, unless "accompanied by proper directions
and warnings." After distinguishing this case from the allergy situation,
where only a susceptible class is involved, and observing that here the
danger was not to a special class of persons but applied in some degree to
all, the court concluded that neither a jury nor a court could exempt the
manufacturer from a duty to warn. The opinion states:
There will, of course, be cases where the personal risk, although existent
and known, is so trifling in comparison with the advantage to be gained as to
be de minimis. Appellee so characterizes this case. It would approach the prob-
lem from a purely statistical point of view: less than one out of a million
is just not unreasonable. This approach we reject. When, in a particular case,
the risk qualitatively (e.g., of death or major disability) as well as quanti-
tatively, on balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for
a true choice judgment, medical or personal, the warning must be given."8
For these reasons the court reversed a judgment for the defendant, find-
ing the vaccine defective and unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law
632 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §5 402A (1965).
"42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A, comment j (1965). See also Traynor, The
Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 373 (1965).
"LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Pa. 1967), discussed supra at note 39.
882 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 55 402A, 402B (1965).
"
7 Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (applying Idaho law).8 Id. at 129.
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in the absence of a warning." The case was remanded for determination of
the causation issue, but illustrates how the duty to warn under strict li-
ability principles may be more demanding than under negligence prin-
ciples, particularly where the court decides for itself that the product is
defective and unreasonably dangerous. In a negligence suit the "duty to
warn" issue might well have been left to the jury in this border line situa-
tion where the risk, while one of grave harm, was extremely remote."
In the polio vaccine case the manufacturer was quite aware of the re-
mote risk involved. Suppose there is no such awareness; may a duty to
warn still arise? It is indicated in the Restatement that at least as to claims
based on allergic reactions the duty to warn does not arise even under
strict liability principles unless the seller "has knowledge, or by the ap-
plication of reasonable developed human skill and foresight should have
knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and of the danger."71
There is considerable authority supporting this limitation on the duty
to warn even in a strict liability situation, at least in the area of allergic
injuries."2 It is submitted, however, that the limitation should not be ap-
plied to products harmful to the population generally, since it involves
foreseeability of a kind usually associated with negligence. This is one of
the problems involved as to cigarettes, where harmful effects are not or-
dinarily regarded as allergic reactions. Two courts have said that even
where the action is based on breach of warranty or some other theory of
strict liability, there is no responsibility where, at the time of the smoking,
the state of medical knowledge was not such as to enable the manufacturer
to foresee that cancer would result from cigarette smoking."
There is a possibility, however, that a product may be regarded as de-
fective and unreasonably dangerous irrespective of the state of human
knowledge. In Green v. American Tobacco Co. " it was found by a Florida
court, in an advisory opinion to the federal court, that there could be a
breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness on account
of harm arising from the sale of cigarettes during a period when the man-
ufacturer "could not by the reasonable application of human skill and
foresight have known of the danger" that users of cigarettes might con-
tract lung cancer. It was added in this opinion that the "contention that
the wholesomeness of a product should be determined on any standard
other than its actual safety for human consumption when supplied for that
" The court cited in support of its conclusion that a drug may be "defective" under 2 RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) because of inadequate warning, Toole v. Richardson-
Merrill, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967), holding that MER/29 was within the strict
liability principle if marketed without adequate warning of known dangers. Accord, Crane v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1965).
70But see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.J.
791, 808 n.95 (1966).
" See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j (1965).7 5See notes 253-56 infra.
71Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (applying Missouri law) (no
liability for harm "without regard to 'developed human skill and foresight' "); Lartigue v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 86 (1963) (applying
Louisiana law) (no liability for harmful effects which no developed skill or foresight could avoid).
"4 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). See also Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d
602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960) (no warning of polio risk; strict liability imposed as to new drug).
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purpose .... has no foundation in the decided cases."" Under this ruling,
a jury could find defectiveness even though the danger in the product was
completely unknown and unsuspected. Actually, the jury found that the
cigarettes were "reasonably" fit and wholesome for human consumption
and that no warranties had been breached."
There was an appeal, however, from this finding, and the plaintiff fin-
ally prevailed." It was held that a verdict should be directed in his favor
on the liability issue, on the ground that Florida decisions since the advis-
ory opinion in the Green case, as to products intended for human use
generally, had not "anywhere modified or limited the requirement of fit-
ness or wholesomeness to 'reasonable' fitness or 'reasonable' wholesome-
ness. ' ' Consequently, since a jury had found in the earlier trial that one
of the proximate causes of Green's cancer was the smoking of the defend-
ant's cigarettes, "his personal representative and widow are entitled to
hold the manufacturer absolutely liable for the injuries already found by
a prior jury to have been sustained by him."79 Accordingly the case was
sent back for a new trial on the issue of damages alone.
There was a dissenting opinion, urging that except in the case of clearly
"defective" products, such as a can of food contaminated with a piece of
tin or harmful bacteria, the Florida law still requires a finding by the jury
that the product is not "reasonably" fit for human consumption, and that
there is no breach of warranty unless the harmful effects of a product are
felt by "a substantial segment of the public.""
A petition to rehear the case has been granted. 1 The prevailing opinion
seems questionable unless the jury finding at the original trial amounted
to an incidental finding that a substantial number of heavy smokers are
apt to contract lung cancer as a result of their smoking. The jury at the
second trial apparently were not impressed by the testimony of the plain-
tiff's experts "that cigarette smoking causes approximately ten per cent of
heavy cigarette smokers to die of lung cancer after about twenty years
of smoking,"8 since they found the cigarettes to be "reasonably" fit for
human consumption, although instructed by the trial judge that cigarettes
were "unwholesome if they affect any responsible segment of the general
public . . .as to . . . lung cancer."" It may well be, as urged by the dis-
senting judge, that this finding should have put an end to the litigation.
Where the danger is in fact unknowable and unsuspected, it is difficult
to see what kind of a warning the manufacturer could give to protect
himself from the unusually strict liability imposed by this appeal of the
Green case. In defense of the ruling, however, it should be observed that
there are other situations in which a supplier incurs liability completely
without fault under warranty principles, as where a retailer sells in a
75154 So. 2d at 173.
76 id. at 170.
7 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Florida law).7 8 1d. at 106.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 111.
"ISee 394 F.2d 156, 157 n.2 (5th Cir. 1968).
82391 F.2d at 103.
83 See id. at 101 (applying Florida law).
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sealed container a product containing some harmful object." Furthermore
it is difficult to class any risks as clearly "unknowable." It may be that at
the time of the cigarette smoking involved in the Green case, scientific
knowledge had in fact developed enough to give rise to a strong but un-
confirmed suspicion in the industry that cigarettes may cause cancer. If
so, it does not seem unfair to require the manufacturer to give the con-
sumer a warning of these suspicions, as suggested in Pritchard v. Liggett
& Meyer Tobacco Co."
Assuming an adequate warning is given, there is much to be said for
the prevailing view that cigarettes are not defective and unreasonably
dangerous, in view of the amount of satisfaction they produce, and the
economic importance of the industry. So in the Restatement, it is asserted
that "good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the ef-
fects of smoking may be harmful," since cigarettes are not "dangerous" to
an extent beyond that which woud be contemplated by the ordinary con-
sumer." This does not mean that a more effective warning than the one
presently employed ("Caution: cigarettes may be hazardous to your
health") should not be required. As scientific evidence accumulates which
shows that cigarette smoking causes a substantial amount of lung cancer
or heart disease, manufacturers should be required to strengthen the pres-
ent mild warning to avoid having their product classed as defective and
unreasonably dangerous, or as unmerchantable under warranty concepts.
Turning to the situation where the supplier actually knows, or has rea-
son to know, of the dangers involved in the use of his product, it is clear
that a failure to warn may be used as the basis for a strict liability case
as well as one based on negligence. So it has been found that a drug is
defective and unreasonably dangerous because not accompanied by ade-
quate warnings as to harmful side effects."'
Where adequate warning is given and the side effect is one which can-
not be eliminated, the tendency has been to find as a matter of law that
the product is not defective." A more difficult problem arises where some
batches of a useful product are likely to be contaminated, but it is not
possible to discover and eliminate the contamination, as where blood plas-
ma happens to contain hepatitis virus. So far the courts have refused to
impose strict liability for illness caused by such plasma where there is
adequate warning of this risk." The most recent case, however, shifts to
84 See 2 FRtUMER & FRIEDMAN S 19.03 (4) (c).
'295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (applying Pennsylvania law).
"6See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A, comment i (1965).
87 See Traynor, supra note 64, at 371.
"Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (applying Idaho law);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263
F. Supp. 159 (S.D.S.D. 1967) (applying South Dakota law). Likewise it was found that shoes
likely to slip on wet asphalt tile could be found defective and unreasonably dangerous if not ac-
companied by a warning of this danger, but this was later reversed because all shoes have some
tendency to become slippery when wet, and the failure to warn against this well known danger
did not make the shoes "unreasonably dangerous." Fanning v. LeMay, 78 I11. App. 2d 166, 222
N.E.2d 815, rev'd, 38 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967).
"Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind. App. 84, 32 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1941); 2 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) O TORTS 5 402A, comment k (1965).
"oMerck & Co. v. Kidd, 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957) (no violation of Federal Pure Food
& Drug Act); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151. 132
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the defendant the burden of showing that the virus is incapable of discov-
ery and removal,"' although the court as a whole declined to pass upon, as
premature, the question of whether liability should be imposed if under
the present state of knowledge hepatitis virus could not be discovered or
removed. In a concurring opinion Judge Roberts did face this problem,
and said no distinction should be made between a practical impossibility
of obtaining knowledge of a dangerous condition, as where a defendant
fails to discover a foreign object in a sealed can, and a scientific impossibil-
ity, as where a virus cannot be discovered because of current lack of hu-
man knowledge and skill. Judge Roberts did distinguish the undetectable
virus case from a case involving a "pure" drug with unknown and cur-
rently unknowable side effects, where the Florida court denied a retailer's
liability."2 This distinction was based on the ground that the blood plasma
is in fact defective, since it contains hepatitis virus which would harm
anyone. Judge Roberts thought that any other holding would be incon-
sistent with the Green cigarette case, which emphasizes that "a manufac-
turer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of a de-
fective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on
the theory of implied warranty . . . ." The cigarettes in the Green case,
however, were made of merchantable tobacco, and it is not known whether
the cancer resulted from some generally harmful ingredient in merchant-
able tobacco, or as a side effect from excessive smoking. It may be that
even if tobacco contains a generally harmful ingredient, blood plasma still
is distinguishable from cigarettes in that the plasma is a vitally needed
drug, and the exact nature of the calculated risk from undetectable hepa-
titis virus is more plainly indicated than is the risk from cigarette smok-
ing.
It has been suggested that the risk of hepatitis could best be assumed by
the supplier, even though this risk is undiscoverable and adequate warning
is given.' One factor in support of this view is that plasma containing this
virus perhaps can more easily be regarded as defective than can a pure
drug with potential side effects. Furthermore, even though no fault is in-
volved, the risk may be one that the supplier can insure against more ef-
fectively than can the occasional hepatitis victim. The chief reason for
rejecting this approach is that if the plasma is as pure as it can be made,
and accompanied by adequate warnings, the courts hesitate to class it as
defective and unreasonably dangerous, or as unmerchantable or unfit, even
where contaminated with a virus. In this connection the manufacturer of
N.W.2d 805 (1965) (no warranty though blood purchased from charitable blood bank; no strict
liability in tort); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (no
sale to give rise to a warranty); cf. Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo.
1964) (expressing serious doubt as to duty of hospital, as distinguished from supplier, to give
warning).
"' Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967). There are indications
that current research will reveal a practical method of eliminating the hepatitis risk. See NEWs-
waEEK, Nov. 18, 1968, at 84.
"McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
.3 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963).
942 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN 5 19.02(2), at 502.5; James, supra note 24, at 1558; Traynor, supra
note 64, at 368.
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a product to which a substantial group of users or consumers are allergic
escapes liability if he gives an adequate warning;" perhaps a warning
should be equally effective to protect the producer of blood plasma which
occasionally will harm a user.
VII. EFFECT OF OBVIOUSNESS OF DANGER ON DUTY To WARN
There is no need to warn of dangers that are obvious (e.g., that a sharp
knife will cut) or of dangers actually known to the user of the product."
Sometimes it is not easy to determine what will be regarded as obvious. In
the leading case on this point an exerciser known as a "Lithe-Line," a
rubber rope with loops at the ends, slipped off the plaintiff's foot and
struck her in the eye, detaching a retina. The court divided as to whether
the risk of such an accident was obvious. The majority stressed that every-
one knows rubber contracts violently when released; the dissenting judges
thought the user might not realize a loop might slip, and that if it did her
eye would be in the direct path of the recoil."7
It has been urged that the duty to warn arises only when the alleged
defect, such as the absence of a safety device, is "latent." Many older cases
support this view,"8 but the courts are beginning to recognize that recov-
ery should not always be denied simply because the absence of some safety
device is apparent. In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons" it was evident to the
owner of a mass-produced house that the plumbing lacked a mixing valve
designed to prevent delivery to the faucets of excessively hot water. It was
not clear, however, whether the owner realized the risk that his small son
might be gravely burned from failure to turn on the cold water before
the hot, as recommended in a booklet delivered to the original purchaser.
In holding that a jury could find negligence, the court rejected the re-
quirement that there must always be a latent defect or concealed danger,
and emphasized instead the unreasonable danger test, thus following writ-
ers rather than earlier decisions on this point."' In another case,01 Judge
Clark, in a dissenting opinion, criticized as a "sterile definitional quibble"
the inquiry as to whether an injury was caused by a "latent" or "patent"
defect, and directed attention to reasonable foreseeability of danger.
Where, however, the danger as well as the defect is evident to most users
95 Sec notes 207-08 infra, and accompanying text. But see James, supra note 24, at 1558, where
allergy cases imposing liability are used as grounds for urging strict liability for defective plasma.
"0Villanueva v. Kent Nowlin, 77 N.M. 174, 420 P.2d 764 (1966); 2 RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 388, comment k (1965). See also Vroman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 387 F.2d
732 (6th Cir. 1967) (applying Michigan law), finding no duty to warn that foreign objects
could be expelled from lawnmower's discharge chute, and other mower cases, discussed in Noel,
Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J.
43, 46 (1965).
"'Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855
(1957).
"Messina v. Clark Equipment Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying New York law);
Campo v.'Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950); Dickerson, Products Liability: How
Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 303 (1967).
9944 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
1001 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 7.02; 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.5, at 1542-45; Noel, Manu-
facturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 838 (1962).1 Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959).
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of a product, the courts are reluctant to find a duty to warn an occasional
inexperienced user. This is illustrated by the cases involving burns result-
ing from ready-mixed concrete containing lime. This product is used for
the most part by contractors or others who realize the risk, but even
plaintiffs who have never used the product before have failed to recover
on the ground that the risk is obvious."2 It would seem that the manu-
facturer should be under a duty to warn do-it-yourself users, even though
the experts fully realize the danger.' As to those who have actual knowl-
edge and realization of the danger, however, there is no duty to warn even
though the danger may be somewhat latent.'"
A recent case, Thibodaux v. McWane Cast Iron Pipe Co.,' raises the
issue of whether there is a duty to warn where the purchaser is an expert
who should realize the danger but apparently does not realize it. The de-
fendant manufacturer had supplied cast iron pipe for underground use
for a natural gas system in a city in southern Louisiana. The soil in this
area was of such a nature as to cause cast iron to corrode at an unusually
rapid rate. As a result of corrosion an explosion occurred which injured
the plaintiff, living in a house situated above the pipe, and killed his wife
and daughter.
The court assumed that pipe manufactured for the sole purpose of dis-
tributing natural gas was "highly dangerous and was likely to cause in-
jury to persons" in this city, and that the manufacturer was chargeable
with this knowledge. In affirming dismissal of this action the court stated
that since the manufacturer was chargeable with knowledge of the dan-
ger, there ordinarily would be a duty to warn. It found no duty in this
case because the city or its consulting engineers were "likewise chargeable
with the same knowledge," adding that there is no duty to warn "where
the other party is already aware of the danger."'"
This decision seems questionable. There was no evidence of actual aware-
ness of the danger by the purchaser or by its consulting engineers. While
a duty to know of the danger, as an expert, might well bar an action by
the purchaser, it is difficult to see why the purchaser's duty to know should
bar a suit by a resident of the city. Intervening negligence might place the
result outside the risk, if this were unforeseeable, but here it was quite
evident that the pipe was being ordered for use in what the court de-
'Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959). There are
similar holdings in Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal. 2d 190, 293 P.2d 26 (1956)
and Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. 2d 946, 227 P.2d 173 (1951).
103 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 8.04; Noel, supra note 12, at 859. Furthermore, even though ex-
perts realize the danger, as where physicians generally realize the risk from the drug Lactigen
when it becomes coagulated, a duty to warn may be found; in this situation the court said, "Some-
times it is well to have our attention called to the things we know best. ... Abbott Labora-
tories v. Lapp, 78 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1935) (applying Illinois law).
104 Morrocco v. Northwest Eng'r Co., 310 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1962) (applying Michigan law).
See also Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem. Works, 53 Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964), (cert.
denied, Tenn. Sup. Ct.), finding no duty to warn surgeon in specialized area that a contrast agent
could cause paralysis. Likewise in Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967), there was no duty to warn against starting bulldozer in gear
when plaintiff knew from protective shield designed to guard against starting except in neutral
that bulldozer could, but should not, be started in gear.




scribes as "a highly dangerous manner." If through a mistake, negligent or
otherwise, a product is ordered for a use which will endanger the lives of
third persons, should not the manufacturer have his usual duty to warn
of the danger? This might result in loss of the sale; but even if the pur-
chaser still wants to go ahead, the manufacturer should refuse to do so,
since it has become evident that the product will be used in such a way
as to endanger life, and thus falls into the category of things that are un-
safe even with a warning." ' Perhaps an unexpressed reason for the deci-
sion was that the pipes had been in the ground for twenty years; the court
may have doubted whether negligence so far back should be regarded as
a significant cause of the accident, particularly since the plaintiff already
had made a substantial settlement with the city.
The rule that there is no duty to warn of obvious dangers applies as
well to strict liability cases. In the comment to the Restatement it is said
there is no duty to warn of dangers from excessive use of a product where
"the danger, or the potentiality of danger is generally known and recog-
nized."'' 8 It is further stated that the user who "discovers a defect and is
aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to use the
product" cannot recover.'" It is immaterial if a third party who is not
aware of the risk is injured, since strict liability normally is restricted to
users or consumers of the product.11 Furthermore apparent dangers of
this sort do not violate the normal expectations of the typical user of the
product, and as a result the product is not defective, even in absence of a
warning, since it is not "dangerous beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."'11
Likewise, where strict liability is based on warranty, recovery is apt to
be denied where the defect is obvious, on the ground that discoverable
defects are not covered by the warranty. So it is said in the Uniform
Commercial Code that when the buyer has full opportunity to examine
the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an
examination ought to have revealed. The official comment adds, "if the
buyer discovers the defect and uses the goods anyway, resulting injuries
may be found to result from his own action rather than proximately from
a breach of warranty.""'
VIII. WARNINGS AS TO UNFORESEEABLE USES OF PRODUCT
A manufacturer does not have to warn against dangers arising only if
the product is used in an unforeseeable way. The manufacturer is entitled
to anticipate that his product will be put to a more or less normal and
107 See notes 33-40 supra. In this connection, however, the risk from inhalation of fumes was
not regarded as known to an experienced painter in absence of evidence that lie actually realized
the danger from toxic silicone waterproofing. Rice v. Gulf States Paint Co., 406 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966).
1082 RESTATEMENT (SscoNo) OF TORTS 402A, comment j (1965).
"05 Id. comment n.
oId. comment 1.
... Id. comment i.
"' See UN FORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-316(3) (b), and comment 8.
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appropriate use, whether the plaintiff's case is based on negligence or on
strict liability.11 So if a man buys an automobile tire that is safe for nor-
mal driving, but installs it on a racing car, he cannot complain that he
was not warned of the risk of a blowout at racing speed. The tire is not
defective because it fails to withstand the special strains to which a racing
tire is subject.
Formerly the courts were reluctant to find liability unless the product
was being used precisely as intended. Twenty years ago a housewife who
splashed cleaning fluid into her oye was unable to recover for permanent
injury because "the cleaning preparation was not intended for use in the
eye. 1. 4 More recently, however, where a painter let a dripping brush come
in contact with the eye of his helper, and the paint contained a chemical
strong enough to cause almost immediate blindness, the jury was permit-
ted to find liability in the absence of any adequate warning of this fore-
seeable risk."'
A later case extends responsibility for unusual uses even further, hold-
ing that a manufacturer could incur liability on both negligence and war-
ranty grounds where a child of six sprayed her hair and dress with in-
flammable hair spray, as if it were perfume, and the dress later caught
fire."' Other decisions permit a jury to find it foreseeable that a chair may
be used to stand on as well as for sitting,"' that a supplier of toys for non-
oral use should anticipate that children may put most anything in their
mouths,11 and that a boy of five might play with and around an open fire
while wearing an inflammable jacket."'
A recent case illustrates the difficulty of determining what uses of a pro-
duct may be foreseeable. In Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks'" the manufac-
turer packaged doors for overseas shipment, placing them in bundles about
forty-two inches high. Each door had a large opening in which a pane of
glass was to be installed at destination, and these openings were lined up
so that they formed a well. A thin cardboard cover was wrapped around
the bundle. This left the solid wooden edges of the doors exposed, but con-
cealed the interior cavity, so that the completed bundle looked as if it were
made up of solid doors. The label on the bundle read "fine doors," with
no warning that the cardboard covered a well. The bundles were deliv-
ered to the docks at Portland, Oregon. When they were stowed for ship-
ment, the longshoremen used bundles already laid down as a floor in stor-
' 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395, comment j (negligence), § 402A, comment b
(strict liability) (1965). See also Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198
N.E.2d 681 (1964) (implied warranty broken only if dangerous use of product in fact fore-
seeable).
114Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1946) (applying Louisiana law).
"' Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
... Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964). See
also 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 8.05.
'" Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 654, 235 P.2d 857, 859
(1951).
"'Victory Sparkler & Speciality Co. v. Latimer, 53 F.2d 3, 5 (8th Cir. 1931) (3-year-old
child ate a "spit devil" firework containing toxic ingredients; defense of unintended use unsuccess-
ful in negligence action).
"OLaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967), discussed at notes 39, 65 supra.
" 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966) (applying Oregon law).
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ing the next layer. When the top layer was reached, there were open
spaces left and a number of hundred pound flour sacks were placed be-
tween the bundles to stabilize the layer. While carrying one of these sacks
the plaintiff stevedore stepped on the cardboard over a well and fell into
the cavity, suffering permanent injuries. The cardboard covering was so
weak that it would not have supported even an unburdened man.
There was testimony as to a general and long continued practice on the
part of stevedores to walk on each layer of cargo as they loaded the next
layer. A packaging expert testified that he had been consulted by twenty-
five to thirty door manufacturers, all of whom knew of the custom of
walking on doors, and that he had packaged their products so that the
bundles would be safe to walk on during loading, either by cutting holes
in the packaging to expose the cavity, or by placing warning notices on
bundles which appeared to be solid but were not. The plant manager of
the defendant, however, testified he did not know the cargo was walked
upon, and representatives of two other door manufacturers likewise said
they lacked such knowledge.
The jury were told they could find negligence if (1) the manufacturer
"knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known" work-
men might walk on the packaged doors, and (2) the bundles created a
dangerous situation which a person of ordinary prudence would have
guarded against by a warning or otherwise. Judgment for plaintiff was
affirmed on a first appeal with one of the three judges dissenting. This
first opinion emphasized that the manufacturer, a shipper of around
17,000 doors a year, was under a duty to possess the knowledge of an
expert, and that "there was ample evidence in the record in this case to
establish both a common practice to walk on cargo during loading and
general knowledge of this usage among those who held themselves out as
qualified to carry on the business of packing cargo for export......
After a petition for rehearing, the case was heard en banc by nine
judges, who divided five to four in favor of the defendant." It was held
the case should go back for a new trial, with instructions to find liability
only if the defendant actually knew of the practice of walking on the
cargo. It was conceded that "the bundle of doors was a trap," if used as a
floor, but the court found no duty to learn of loading practices when "the
product is such an ordinarily harmless item as a package of doors, a prod-
uct which cannot explode, ignite, strike, poison or cause skin diseases and
which, without doubt, was not intended to be used, ultimately or at any
time, as a floorway."''
The plaintiff sought review in the Supreme Court, which on certiorari
reversed."' The final opinion is a single sentence, citing an earlier decision ...
holding that actual knowledge of a peril is not essential where a dangerous
...Id. at 327.
"' Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966) (applying Oregon law).
::Id. at 329.
"" Parks v. Simpson Timber Co., 388 U.S. 459 (1967), rev'g mer. 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.1966).
"'SAlbanese v. Maats, 382 U.S. 283 (1965).
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situation is foreseeable. This final decision in Parks is in accord with gen-
eral negligence principles. As pointed out in the Restatement," the basic is-
sue is whether an unreasonable danger has been created. This is determined
by balancing the likelihood of harm and its gravity against the burden of
making precautions which would avoid the risk.'27 It is no longer necessary
that the product be "inherently" or "intrinsically" dangerous."'
Parks may conflict with an earlier decision"' which held that the manu-
facturer of steel casements was under no duty to foresee that crossbars ap-
parently firmly affixed would be used by workmen as a ladder, in spite of
a common practice of this effect; but it seems more sound to require the
manufacturer to guard not only against risks he actually realizes, but ones
a reasonable manufacturer would anticipate. Ordinarily a manufacturer
is held to the knowledge and skill of an expert in his trade, whether he
possesses it or not."' If most shippers knew that cargo was used as a floor,
and the custom was a general one, a jury could find that this large ship-
per should have learned of the custom and taken account of it. The de-
fendant's plant manager admitted he had seen the holds of ships, and
often "wondered" how cargo was moved to portions of the hold away
from the hatches. Perhaps he should have stopped wondering and found
out. As the dissenters in the en banc opinion observed, the slightest effort
on Simpson's part could have disclosed both the risk and the simple pre-
cautions necessary to avoid harm."' To hold that a manufacturer may rely
on lack of knowledge of risks which a reasonably prudent person engaged
in the business would have discovered places a premium on ignorance and
certainly does not promote safety.
One commentator in approving the original Parks opinion for the plain-
tiff may go too far in imposing a duty on the manufacturer to discover
what he calls "unforeseeable but common uses of the product.""' All the
original decision holds is that a jury could find this use was in fact fore-
seeable by a manufacturer engaged in extensive export shipping. It seems
odd to say, as does this comment, that a product use which is both com-
mon and generally known by others in the business can, at the same time,
be regarded as unforeseeable. Unless the use is foreseeable, there would
seem to be no basis for liability in a negligence action, and it would be
difficult to prove the defectiveness and unreasonable danger essential for
strict liability. On the other hand, where the unusual use is foreseeable, it
does not seem harsh to impose a duty, particularly when the danger can
be avoided by a simple warning.
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
127 See 2 HARPER & JAMES S 28.4, at 1542.
128 See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395, comment d (1965); Smith v. Atco Co.,
6 Wis. 2d 371, 383, 94 N.W.2d 697, 704 (1959).
"' McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959). See also Mannsz v.
MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (denying, questionably, a duty to foresee that wire
rope made for elevator use would be used for scaffold).
'302 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395, comment j (1965); 2 HARPER & JAMES 5
28.4, cited with approval in Wright v. Carter Prod., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying
Massachusetts law). See also cases cited in Noel, supra note 12, at 847.
"'. Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 369 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir. 1966) (applying Oregon law).
'"Note, Torts: Duty of a Manufacturer To Discover Unforeseeable Common Uses of His
Product, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1190 (1966).
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While it is evident that the manufacturer is being required to foresee
more and more in the way of unusual uses, there are limits to what is ex-
pected of him. This may be illustrated by a case where a boy's arm was
severed when he opened the cover of a school laundry machine while the
spinner was revolving. A safety device which prevented the cover from
being raised while the extractor was spinning had been provided, but this
device had broken and had not been replaced. The jury found negligence
in the failure to place a warning on the machine. On appeal the court
found no duty to warn against a danger which would arise only if a safe-
ty feature provided by the manufacturer should be broken or improperly
maintained by the user of the product. There is no obligation to foresee
that the user of the product "will alter its condition so as to make it dan-
gerous, or that he will continue to use it after it becomes dangerous due
to alteration of safety devices intended to protect the user from harm..'.
A recent case shows there is no duty to warn that a product may in
some circumstances be combined with another so as to cause harm.' This
issue arose where sodium azide manufactured by the defendant was sold
to a research laboratory engaged in secret research on solid fuel propel-
lants for rocket engines. The plaintiff, a laboratory technician, acting
under the direction of a chemist, added the sodium azide to a compound
called fumaryl diazide, and started to filter out this compound. An ex-
plosion occurred which caused the loss of plaintiff's hand. In directing a
verdict for defendant, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim of a duty to
warn that sodium azide, if mixed with various other chemicals, would be
likely to produce an explosion. The decision was partly on the ground that
the product was furnished to expert chemists who would know the prop-
erties of sodium azide and the dangers of mixing it with various other
chemicals.
A questionable decision involving a mixture concerned a drain solvent.
When the solvent was used to unclog a pipe, a spray containing sodium
hydroxide burst from the pipe with such force that it covered the walls
and ceiling of the room where the plaintiff was working, and permanently
blinded the plaintiff. There was expert testimony that the explosion was
caused by a combination of the lye in the solvent with zinc fragments in
the pipe, a combination which would produce hydrogen. The label on the
solvent described the product as safe. There was no warning of the risk
that explosive gases might be generated, or that it might be necessary to
wear protective goggles.
A divided court held that a complaint against the manufacturer and
the distributor should be dismissed.'3s It was emphasized that the plaintiff,
an experienced plumber, had used this solvent for years without exper-
iencing any difficulty, and apparently there was no available evidence of
other explosions. This does not establish that none ever occurred, nor does
... Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W.2d 312 (1967).
"
4 Croteau v. Borden Co., 277 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 395 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1968)
(applying Pennsylvania law).
"l Stief v. J.A. Sexauer Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 897 (1967)
(applying New York law).
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"a long history of good fortune" exclude a conclusion by the trier of fact
that ordinary prudence requires a warning." Galvanized pipe frequently
is coated with zinc. Hydrogen is particularly apt to form under high tem-
peratures, and the user was directed to dissolve the solvent in "boiling
water." It seems clear that a jury could find this accident foreseeable by a
manufacturer with a duty to possess expert knowledge,""1 and that a warn-
ing of the danger of explosion was needed.'
Failure To Follow Instructions as an Unusual Use. In some recent cos-
metic cases recovery has been denied because the plaintiffs had failed to
follow explicit instructions regarding the use of the product. One of these
cases, Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co. v. Langley," involved a home
permanent wave solution. It was stated on the carton that the preparation
was "[F]or any type of hair," but an accompanying pamphlet added,
"[I]f your hair is bleached, tinted, or color treated in any way ... make
test curls to see if your hair can take a wave." As to the timing for the test
curl, it was stated in the pamphlet, "[L]eave hair in curlers ten minutes,"
and that if strands tested "feel sticky or gummy, use the liquid neutralizer
at once and do not wave any more of your hair." Further instructions
stated, "if your test curls, when dry, are frizzy, discolored, break easily
or show any other signs of hair damage, this also means that you should
not wave the rest of your hair."
The plaintiff, whose hair had been tinted, tested it by leaving the lotion
on a test curl for four minutes instead of ten. She found the test curl was
sticky but omitted to use the neutralizer, continuing to apply the lotion.
Later her hair started breaking off near the scalp to the extent that she
had to secure a wig.
The jury found the product unmerchantable and unfit for the purpose
intended and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The appellate court
reversed, partly for lack of any substantial evidence that the product was
defective. On a petition to rehear, however, the court seemed to assume
that defectiveness and causation might have been established by circum-
stantial evidence, but emphasized as the basis for its decision that strict
liability does not mean "a consumer may knowingly violate the plain un-
ambiguous instructions and ignore the warnings, then hold the makers,
distributors and sellers of a product liable in the face of the obvious mis-
use of the product."'" As the court points out, it is provided in the Re-
statement that "[W]here a warning is given, the seller may reasonably as-
sume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warn-
ing, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor
"a Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, 296 F.2d 623, 626 (2d Cir. 1961).
' See notes 53, 60 supra, and accompanying text.
138 In an unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Chandler v. Hunt Food Indus.,
Inc., decided in 1968, a case involving the alleged explosion of a bottle of low pressure cooking
oil was dismissed on the pleadings, but only because of failure to allege that a bottle partially re-
filled with hot oil creates any appreciable risk of explosion.




is it unreasonably dangerous. 1 ' There seems to be no evidence in the
case, circumstantial or otherwise, that the product was defective or un-
reasonably dangerous when the directions and warnings were followed,
although it may be that the warnings were not emphatic enough, or clearly
enough separated from instructions for use.
Since it further appeared from the plaintiff's own testimony that she
had read the directions in the pamphlet, understanding them to mean
"just what they say," the court could properly find as a matter of law
that the plaintiff deliberately assumed the risk. Some support for this con-
clusion may be derived from the Texas decision in Shamrock Fuel & Oil
Sales Co. v. Tunks"' which clearly holds that ordinary contributory negli-
gence is not a bar in a strict liability case, but makes it equally clear that
deliberate assumption of a known risk by the plaintiff is a defense.
It seems doubtful, however, that Langley should be based on the grounds
of improper use of the product, as distinguished from defectiveness. The
lotion was being used for the very purpose for which it was intended. If
the plaintiff had not read the instructions, she would be guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, but would be saved by the doctrine laid down in the
Tunks case that ordinary contributory negligence is not a bar to a strict
liability claim. It seems inconsistent to hold that failure to carefully read
and follow instructions is something other than contributory negligence.
It would seem that the defense of unusual use should be restricted to
cases where the product is being used for some distinctly unintended and
unforeseeable purpose, as if someone had used the lotion as a shampoo and
had suffered harm as a result.
There is, however, another application of the abnormal use doctrine
where instructions were not followed in Helene Curtis Industries, Inc.
v. Pruitt,"'" involving two separate bleaching products, Helene Curtis New
Blue Bleach manufactured by Helene Curtis, and L'Oreal Creme Developer
manufactured by Cosmair. Both products were intended for use only by
professional beauticians, and on the Curtis bleach container was the state-
ment, "For Professional use only-not for public sale." In this instance
both products were purchased from a beauty parlor by a friend of the
plaintiff, a Mrs. Hendren, who had no professional training. The two
products were mixed together and Mrs. Hendren applied the mixture to
the plaintiff's hair. As a result the plaintiff suffered third degree chemical
burns on her scalp and ear.
The directions which accompanied the Helene Curtis bleach stated, "Do
not mix Helene Curtis new Blue Bleach with anything except Helene
Curtis Creme Developer (or a good-grade of fresh twenty volume hydro-
gen peroxide)." The label on the Cosmair bleach listed various products
with which it might be mixed, not including Helene Curtis bleach.
After the mixture had been on the plaintiff's head for fifteen or twenty
minutes she complained of a burning sensation. Mrs. Hendren then washed
141 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j (1965).
142416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967). See also 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment M (1965).
143 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967).
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off the solution and called a physician, who testified that the chemical
burns were produced "by the application of the bleaching substance she
told me she used on her scalp."
The jury found both products contained "corrosive substances" which
were a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, that the plaintiff had fol-
lowed the directions which accompanied the product, and was not negli-
gent in mixing or applying the products. On appeal from a judgment for
$64,500 it was found the jury could not rationally have inferred that the
products involved were defective. As an added basis for its decision the
court added, "[m]oreover a mixture of these products amounted to an
abnormal handling or substantial alteration which, because it was unin-
tended and unforeseen, excuses the makers from responsibility for any
harm."' 4
It is significant that the plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence that
it was customary for users of hair bleach to mix different brands. This fac-
tor as well as the failure to observe instructions not to mix the products
supports the conclusion that the mixing amounted to an abnormal use.
Likewise the failure to introduce evidence of any practice on the part of
beauty shops to resell these products supports the conclusion that any use
of this product by an amateur was an abnormal one. As pointed out, how-
ever, in connection with the Langley case there is risk that if any departure
from instructions is regarded as an abnormal use, the court may in sub-
stance be permitting the defense of ordinary contributory negligence in a
strict liability situation. '
IX. PERSONS To BE WARNED
The duty to warn runs to those the manufacturer should expect to use
the chattel, or be endangered by its probable use, and the warning must
be reasonably calculated to reach such persons, directly or indirectly.'"
This does not mean that every potential user must be warned by the man-
ufacturer himself, as illustrated by Foster v. Ford Motor Co."' involving
a tractor used by an employee of the purchaser. The tractor became stuck
in the mud, and in attempting to unmire it, the employee engaged the
clutch suddenly, with the result that the tractor upended and fell on the
operator.
The purchaser had been warned of this danger, both by the salesman
and in the owners' manual. The court found the warning to the actual pur-
chaser sufficient to make the tractor safe, and that there was no duty to
warn the individual operator of the danger which would arise only when
unusual power was suddenly applied. If the danger of overturning had
been greater, or if the product had been one likely to be used by someone
without seeking instruction, the manufacturer probably would have been
obliged to attach some warning to the machine itself. So where a gas re-
'441d. at 856.
1 See Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
146 See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN S 8.03(3); 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.7, at 1548; 2 RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
147139 Wash. 341, 246 P. 945 (1926), Annot., 48 A.L.R. 934 (1926).
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frigerator was apt to emit dangerous carbon monoxide gas unless the
burner was regularly cleaned, it was held that a secondhand purchaser
could recover. Since there was doubt that a warning to the original pur-
chaser would have been adequate to correct this danger, the jury was per-
mitted to find a negligent design in the absence of a warning attached to
the refrigerator itself. 4 '
Other decisions, however, hold as in the Foster case that there is no duty
to warn employees of the purchaser. '" In one such case a workman devel-
oped a serious skin disorder, chlor-acne, as a result of contact with wax
containing chlorinated napthalenes. The trial judge instructed that the de-
fendant had a duty to directly warn every user of the wax, with warning
labels on every container. On appeal it was found that this would place an
impossible burden on the manufacturer, and that his duty was simply to
assure himself that the "immediate vendee and distributor was so informed
as to be able and likely to transmit to those who would purchase and use
this wax knowledge of its dangers and of the needed precautions."'* Con-
sequently, if the warning to the distributor on the original containers was
adequate, it could be found reasonable, under all the circumstances, to re-
ly on the distributor for the re-labeling of smaller lots. This is in accord
with the Restatement comment, that "life would be intolerable unless one
were permitted to rely to a certain extent on others doing what they nor-
mally do, particularly if it is their duty to do so.'.... Where the product,
however, is extremely dangerous, such reliance on others to transmit a
needed warning may not be justified, for where improper use of the pro-
duct involves risk of serious bodily harm or death, the supplier "is required
to make the chattel carry its own directions by placing them upon the con-
tainer."s' Perhaps in the chlor-acne case, where the product caused a se-
vere skin condition all over the plaintiff's body, the trial judge thought the
wax presented an extreme danger.
Even in the case of a dangerous product, such as high presure shells de-
signed for testing guns, there is no duty to warn a person against using the
shells as ordinary ammunition where the manufacturer has no reason to
foresee use of the overcharged shells by anyone other than manufacturers
and dealers who would understand the meaning of the markings on this
148Beadless v. Severel, 344 I11. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951).
145Bertone v. Turco Prods., Inc., 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958) (applying New Jersey law)
(adequate warning of dangers from chemical on drum delivered to employer); West v. Hydro-
Test, Inc., 196 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 1967) (no need to attach instructions to each item, exposed
to all sorts of weather); McDaniel v. Williams, 23 App. Div. 2d 729, 257 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1965)
(professional gallon jar of product sold to beauty parlor had warning on label); Thomas v. Arvon
Prods. Co., 424 Pa. 365, 227 A.2d 897 (1967) (warning to employer of need for ventilation
when using product; directions for use to employer suficient).
0 Weeks v. Michigan Chrome & Chem. Co., 352 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1965) (applying Michigan
law).
'51 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs S 388, comment n (1965). So where drugs are sold
only to physicians, it is enough to give adequate warnings and directions to them. Love v. Wolf,
226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964); 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN S 33.01(3) n.2.1.
19 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 397, comment b (1965). This duty to warn the user
directly as to extremely dangerous products was upheld where a retailer was supplied with a mixture
of gasoline and kerosene; supplier liable when death resulted from use of mixture to light stove, al-
though retailer advised of the mistake. Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507,
271 S.W. 570 (1925).
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ammunition."' Likewise, a manufacturer of a fuse for dynamite caps may
take into account that his product is intended for use only by skilled per-
sons, and is not liable when he fails to warn an unsophisticated user of
the short burning time of the fuse. " '
There is a decision of doubtful soundness involving a tear gas gun made
to look like a fountain pen, with the clasp as a trigger. A customer picked
up this harmless looking article and accidentally discharged the tear gas
into his face. It was held by a divided court that since the purchaser was
fully informed of the nature of the article, the manufacturer could not be
found negligent.' s5 Since, however, the customer was advised to keep the
gun in readiness on his desk, it would seem that there should have been
some warning on the article itself of the danger involved in pressing the
ordinary looking clasp which was in fact a trigger.
X. ADEQUACY OF WARNING
The adequacy of a particular warning ordinarily is decided by the
jury."' Often the warning is found inadequate because of lack of clarity,
which may arise from contradictory statements, or from use of technical
terms."5 ' So a statement that paint contained calcium oxide could be found
inadequate as a warning, since the average person does not know this
means lime, and that lime may cause blindness."' One case raises the ques-
tion of what must be done where the product, chemicals used for dusting
and spraying crops, may be used by foreign or illiterate workers who can-
not read English. Two Puerto Rican workmen died after using these chem-
icals for a day, apparently without the protective clothing and mask stated
to be necessary on the manufacturer's label. The court allowed the jury
to find the label inadequate on the ground that a skull and cross bones, or
comparable symbols, should have been included, since it was foreseeable
that the product would be used by persons of limited reading ability." '
Occasionally the warning is too narrow in scope. So where there was
warning that a caustic drain cleaner was poisonous, but there was no in-
'aaHarper v. Remington Arms Co., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N.Y.S. 862 (1935), aff'd without
opinion, 248 App. Div. 713, 290 N.Y.S. 130 (1936).
"'Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965); Little-
hale v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274
(2d Cir. 1967) (no warning to expected purchaser of blasting caps needed, hence no duty to warn
an unforeseeable repurchaser). See also cases discussed note 102 supra, involving harm from lime
in cement. Statutes or regulations often require that highly dangerous articles such as poisons,
explosives and inflammables shall bear on their face some prescribed notice of their dangerous
character. 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 8.07(1). Compliance with these standards is some evidence
of due care. Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (1957). It does not con-
clusively establish freedom from negligence, since the statutes and regulations establish simply
certain minimum requirements. See notes 173-77 infra, and accompanying text.
"Scurfield v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 355 Pa. 145, 6 A.2d 559 (1939).
158 Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964), second appeal, 249 Cal.
App. 2d 822, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967); Toole v. Richardson-Merrill, 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60
Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (inadequate warning to profession of side effects of MER/29 where warn-
ing impaired by representations of safety); Bine v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 623 (Mo.
1968); Cockran v. Brooke, 243 Ore. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966); Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352
Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945).
'McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953).
.. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).




dication that if too much of the cleaner was poured into a drain this
might cause not simply "effervescence" but a blinding explosion, the
warning was inadequate.'" In a chemical wced killer case there was warn-
ing of danger from direct physical contact, but no sufficient warning of
the danger from contact with earth on which the product had been
spilled. ' Similarly, a warning that paint is irritating to skin is not a warn-
ing against the risk of injury to sight if the paint comes in contact with
the eye.'
Sometimes the difficulty is that the intensity of the warning has been
watered down,1 63 or is diminished by a representation of safety. So where a
manufacturer placed in large letters, on all four sides of a can of cleaning
fluid containing carbon tetrachloride, the words "Safety-Kleen," with a
warning in much smaller letters to use the product only in well ventilated
places, the warning was found by the jury to be inadequate." ' The assur-
ance of safety may be significant even though the actual user of the pro-
duct does not see and rely on it, as where a child wearing inflammable
material near a toy pistol which emitted "cold" sparks was burned. The
pistol was represented as "absolutely harmless," and it was found imma-
terial that the child never saw the representation, for without the assurance
of safety the child's parents would have been less likely to provide the
child with this toy without adequate supervision or warnings. " '
Sometimes the warning is not sufficiently prominent. One case holds,
questionably, that a warning in letters large enough to comply with "the
standard of the industry" is sufficient as a matter of law. 6"' Granted that
compliance with industry custom is evidence of ordinary care, still an
industry should not be able to set its own uncontrolled standards, for oc-
casionally a whole calling may lag in the adoption of adequate precau-
tions."' Thus, in Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co.,'' the fact that suppliers
'Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1961).
"'. Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Ore. 1963) (applying Oregon law).
162Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
"' See Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) involving grave
brain damage from use of the drug Quadrigen, containing a combination of four antigenes to
cover vaccination against four illnesses. The court observed that the producer of a dangerous drug,
by employing in a brochure and package insert "the technique of ambiguity and a shrewd use of
descriptive adjectives was able to gloss over these facts which would have dissuaded the doctors
and dispensaries from using their product, thereby lulling the medical profession into a false sense
of security." The court concluded that a more adequate warning would have led doctors to pre-
scribe other available and more stable vaccines.
164 Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945). See also Love v. Wolf, 226
Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964), second appeal, 249 Cal. App. 2d 822, 58 Cal. Rptr.
42 (1967) ("overpromotion" of chloromycetin, by advertising and representations of detail men
regarded as bearing on adequacy of warning given); cf. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 503
(Fla. 1958) (death from carbon tetrachloride; warning inadequate even though no assurance of
safety). See also Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967) (risk of loss of sight
from aralen; jury could find negligent failure to give to physicians adequate warning of this seri-
ous risk by reference to danger of "visual disturbances") ; La Plante v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 346 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (mislabeling of weed killer so as to mislead into
believing it was not harmful to humans found to be actionable negligence).
... Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y.S. 496 (1930).
166Barton v. Myers, I Mich. App. 460, 136 N.W.2d 776 (1965).
"'The T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). See also the state-
ment by Holmes, "What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what
ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with
or not." Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
6'237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
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of blasting fuses did not customarily give warning of the burning time of
the fuse was not conclusive on the question of whether there was a duty
to warn. On the other hand where a certain type of warning, such as the
odorization of natural gas, is customary a failure to give this warning may
constitute negligence as a matter of law.'
Perhaps the most significant recent case dealing with the adequacy of a
warning is Yarrow v. Sterling Drug Co.,70 involving failure to warn suf-
ficiently of the risk of loss of vision from use of the drug aralen (chloro-
quine) for an arthritic condition. The company had advised physicians of
the increasing risk of occular complications by means of a series of pro-
duct cards, by a letter, and in the Physicians Desk Reference Book. Even
so the warnings were inadequate because of the company's failure to utilize
its detail men, employed to promote and explain its drugs, to keep physi-
cians advised as to dangerous side effects. The court stated:
Where the doctor is inundated with the literature and product cards of the
various drug manufacturers, as shown here by the facts, a change in the
literature or an additional letter intended to present new information on drugs
to the doctor is insufficient. The most effective method employed by the drug
company in the promotion of new drugs is shown to be the use of detail men;
thus, the Court feels that this would also present the most effective method
of warning the doctor about recent developments in drugs already employed
by the doctor, at no great additional expense. The detail men visit the doctors
at frequent intervals and could make an effective oral warning, accompanied
by literature on the development, that would affirmatively notify the doctor
of side effects such as shown in the facts in this case. M
This emphasis on using detail men to give warnings, even though other
warnings are given, represents new development. Assuming physicians
are increasingly relying on detail men, who often have considerable back-
ground in the drug field, it may well be that other courts also will insist
on use of detail men for the communication of warnings.
Sometimes a subsequent warning may be utilized to show the inadequacy
of an earlier one. So a plaintiff with aplastic anemia caused by chloromyce-
tin contended that a warning label used in 1952, when the drug was pre-
scribed by the plaintiff's physician, was inadequate. The plaintiff's doctor
testified that had he seen a later warning label, used in 1961, he would not
have prescribed chloromycetin. Defendant's officials testified that both
warnings were entirely adequate and essentially the same, but it was held
that the 1961 label was admissible in evidence for the limited purpose of
impeaching this testimony, and showing "the feasibility of eliminating the
unclear warning of the earler date."' 7
Effect of Statutes and Regulations. A manufacturer is not fully protected
169 Roberts v. Indiana Gas & Water Co., 218 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. App. 1966).
17263 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.S.D. 1967) (applying South Dakota law).
Id. at 163.
'"Love v. Wolf, 249 Cal. App. 2d 822, 831, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (1967). A trial court's
admission of the warning for all purposes was not regarded as prejudicial, partly because the de-
fendant's attorney made no request for a limiting instruction; and partly, because the inadequacy
of the earlier warning was based mainly on evidence of overpromotion of the drug. See note 151
supra, and accompanying text.
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by the fact that he has complied with applicable statutory or administra-
tive regulations.' Thus in a carbon tetrachloride case the court observed
that while the Surgeon General had approved the labels used, this official
lacked authority to prescribe the standards of due care in Pennsylvania.174
Likewise where workers were poisoned by the defendant's spray, the fact
that the label was in the precise form submitted to the Department of Ag-
riculture under the Federal Insecticide Act was merely evidence that due
care had been used.17 In a chloromycetin case, compliance with the warn-
ing regulation approved by the Food and Drug Administration was not
necessarily adequate, particularly when the defendant's advertising played
down the warning.' s In two more recent drug cases where warnings of
side effects were found to be inadequate, government regulations were re-
garded as "minimal," and compliance with these regulations was not suf-
ficient to establish an adequate warning." '
In a recent Texas case" ' involving roach poison (thallium) consumed
by a three-year-old boy, the poison had been placed by the mother in some
bottle caps on a high shelf, as directed, but the child consumed some of
the poison when it was removed by an older playmate. The product had
been registered under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act,' and the label, which included the word "poison" and a red skull
and crossbones, had been approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, as
well as by the State Department of Health, in compliance with the Texas
Hazardous Substance Act.' As an antidote the label simply stated: "Give
a tablespoon of salt in a glass of warm water and repeat until vomit fluid
is clear. Have victim lie down and keep warm. Call a physician immedi-
ately!" Both federal and state statutes required that the label indicate either
an antidote or first aid treatment. The child was taken within a few min-
utes after the accident was discovered to a doctor, who searched in books
and inquired in vain for an antidote for thallium. Finally, a second doctor
took the child to a hospital where his stomach was pumped, but a fatal
amount of the poison had been absorbed.
A verdict was directed for the defendant, since all federal and state sta-
tutes and regulations had been complied with, but this action was reversed,
with the statement:
Neither the State nor the Federal Act purports to change the common law
duty to warn. It merely authorizes the marketing of specified economic poisons
if the statutes and regulations promulgated are complied with. Neither Act
purports to deal with property rights. It makes it a crime to market such a
product without complying with the Act. Failure to comply with the Act
1732 HARPER & JAMES § 17.6, at 1014; W. PROSSER, TORTS S 35, at 205 (3d ed. 1964).
77'Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945), discussed at note 164 supra.
'"Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965) (applying Massa-
chusetts law).
'"Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rpti. 183 (1964), discussed at notes 151,
172 supra.
'"Sterling Drug Co. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying Missouri law);
Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966) (applying North Dakota law).
178 Rumsey v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
1"7 U.S.C.A. §§ 135-135b (1961).
'
80 See TEX. PEN. ConE ANN. art. 726-1 (1961).
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would be negligence per se. However, a mere compliance does not as a matter
of law, in all cases, mean that the party is free from negligence.18'
Consequently, a jury could find common law negligence from the failure
to warn that there was no specific antidote, and that once the poison had
been absorbed there was no way to counteract its fatal effects. The court
found "a common law duty to warn of the full extent of the danger and
certainly a poison for which there is no specific antidote has more potential
for harm than does a poison for which there is a specific antidote.' 82 If a
warning about the lack of an antidote had been given, the mother might
immediately have used the emetic instead of taking the child to a physician,
or the physician might have promptly emptied the child's stomach instead
of searching in vain for an antidote.
It is of course necessary to comply with the warning and labeling pro-
visions prescribed in various statutes, such as the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act, "3 the Hazardous Substances Act,'M and False Advertising
Statutes. 8' In that connection it should be noted that the Hazardous Sub-
stances Act recently has been amended by the Child Protection Act of
1966,'" to broaden its coverage. It is now necessary, for example, to warn
consumers against possible injury from drugs, cosmetics and food in pres-
surized containers, and to avoid completely the sale of toys and other chil-
dren's articles containing hazardous substances, regardless of how they are
packaged or labeled."'
In the area of motor vehicle defects, the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 " has a considerable impact on the duty to
warn. The Act creates a new statutory duty on the part of every manu-
facturer of motor vehicles, whenever he discovers a defect, which he de-
termines, in good faith, relates to motor vehicle safety, to notify the pur-
chaser within a reasonable time after discovery of the defect. The notifica-
tion must be sent by certified mail to the first purchaser of the vehicle for
use, as well as to the dealer, and to any subsequent purchaser to whom the
warranty has been transferred. The notice must not only describe the de-
fect, but evaluate the risk it creates, and state the measures needed to re-
pair the defect.'88 A copy of all notices or bulletins sent to dealers about
defects, as well as copies of the statutory notices, must be sent to the Sec-
retary of Transportation, who may disclose to the public any information
in the notices along with other information obtained under his own in-
vestigating powers, if he thinks such disclosure will further the purposes
of the Act. Furthermore, if the Secretary determines after investigation
and hearing that any motor vehicle does not meet an applicable safety
181 Rumsey v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
'i8 d. at 393.
18321 U.S.C.A. §§ 361, 321 (1961).
184Pub. L. No. 86-613, 74 Stat. 372 (1960), as amended by Child Protection Act of 1966, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1261-1273 (Supp. 1968).
'5 15 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1961); Gonzales v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 239 F. Supp. 567
(E.D.S.C. 1965) (applying South Carolina law); 1 FRUMER & FIEDMAN § 8.07.
188 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1261-1273 (Supp. 1968).
'
8 7 See 11 PERSONAL INJURY NEWSLETTER 131 (1966); 80 Stat. 1303 (1966).
1815 U.S.C.A. § 1381-1425 (Supp. 1968).
'
89 Id. §§ 1402(a), (b), (c) (Supp. 1968).
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standard, or has a defect which relates to safety, he may direct the manu-
facturer to give the statutory notification to purchasers and dealers.'
It seems clear that failure to give any warning notice of a defect which
is required under the statute will constitute evidence of negligence, or neg-
ligence per se.' 1 Where the warning has been given, persons injured as
a result of the defect will have the benefit of a clear record that the defect
exists, and the date of the notice may furnish evidence as to whether it was
discovered with sufficient promptness. The wording of the notice may pro-
vide significant evidence as to whether the nature of the defect and the
extent of the danger were made sufficiently clear, and whether adequate
measures for the correction of the defect were indicated. On the defense
side, the notice will help establish contributory fault on the part of a pur-
chaser who continues to use the vehicle without taking the specified cor-
rective measures.
XI. CONTINUING DUTY To WARN
A recent development deals with the duty of a manufacturer to give
warning of defects he discovers after his product has been sold and deliv-
ered. In the case of motor vehicles, as has been shown, a warning of this
kind is specifically required by the new National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966.' This duty arises not only with respect to defects
arising as a result of the manufacturer's negligence, but as to any defects
which relate to motor vehicle safety."4
There is some basis for a common law duty to advise previous purcha-
sers of newly discovered dangerous defects. In Comstock v. General Mo-
tors Corp. ' the manufacturer of one of the first cars with power brakes
discovered, after thousands of cars had ben sold, a defect which might
cause a sudden loss of brake fluid with a resulting no-brake condition.
Dealers were notified and supplied with kits for replacement of the defec-
tive unit.
A jury was permitted to find negligence from a failure to warn indi-
vidual owners, even though no carelessness as to the original design was
established, since the manufacturer "did not warn those into whose hands
they had placed this dangerous instrument and whose lives (along with the
lives of others) depended upon defective brakes which might fail without
notice. ' "
The same sort of continuing duty was imposed on the manufacturer of
an airplane propeller system, who knew that at times the propeller could
not be feathered when an engine had to be turned off, with consequent
risk of decoupling and fire. This occurred, with the result that a large plane
"0o Id. § 1402(d).
" See discussion at note 23 supra. See also Comment, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Legislation,
29 OH0O ST. L.J. 177, 214 (1968).
192 See Nader & Page, supra note 16, at 671.
'9315 U.S.C.A. §§ 1402(a), (b), (c) (Supp. 1968).
194 See note 189 supra. The notification must describe the defect, indicate any risk related to
it, and repair measures.
'9'358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959), Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 449 (1959).
' 99 N.W.2d at 634.
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fell into the ocean. A device to prevent overspeeds in the propeller finally
had been developed, about six months after this plane was delivered, and
about five months before the accident. The manufacturer was found neg-
ligent not only in failing to make the new safety device available to the
owners of this plane, but in failing to warn of numerous malfunctions of
the propeller system prior to the accident. 97 This decision and the Con-
stock case indicate that warnings comparable to those provided for in the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966198 may be required
with reference to products generally, when the manufacturer discovers
some dangerous defect in his product, even though there was no original
negligence in connection with the defect.199 Of course, with the growing
trend toward strict liability, it is to the manufacturer's interest to have all
defects corrected, since he may incur responsibility for any defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition which existed when the product left his
hands, regardless of how it arose.
XII. THE DUTY To WARN ALLERGIC USERS
Medical descriptions of how allergic reactions occur are complicated
and still developing. From a legal standpoint, the established and signifi-
cant factor is that an allergic reaction is one suffered by only a minority
of the persons exposed to a particular substance.' ° In this connection, a
"sensitizer" is to be distinguished from a "primary irritant," which is some-
thing that produces irritation on the skin of the majority of normal per-
sons.
The sensitizing capacity of various substances differs enormously. Some-
times many exposures are necessary to develop allergic reactions, and these
reactions may be confined to a very few people. Where a "strong sensi-
tizer" is involved, the allergic reaction develops within a very limited time
of exposure in much larger numbers of people."°'
In the early allergy cases the plaintiff received little consideration.
The action ordinarily was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff's own
...Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964).
19915 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. 1968).
'See also Cornish v. Sterling Drug Co., CCH PRoDs. LIAB. RPTR. 5 5415 (1965), aff'd,
370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying Missouri law); see 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 8.02, citing
additional cases.
2. See Nelson, Medical-Legal Aspects of Allergies, 24 TENN. L. REv. 840 (1957) defining
allergy as "Itihe condition or state of an individual who reacts specifically and with unusual
symptoms to the administration of, or to contact with, a substance which when given in similar
amounts to the majority of all other individuals proves harmless or innocuous." Ordinarily an
allergic skin rash or other reaction does not occur with the first exposure to what is called the
"sensitizer" in the product, but only at the time of a subsequent or "eliciting" exposure occurring
five days or more after the original exposure. 3 FRUMER & FEEDMAN §§ 28.01 (2), (7).
'0'3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 28.01(7). An up-to-date definition of a "strong sensitizer" is
contained in the Federal Hazardous Substance Act, Pub. L. No. 86-613, 74 Stat. 372 (1960), as
amended by the Child Protection Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1261-1273 (Supp. 1968), provid-
ing "The term 'strong sensitizer' means a substance which will cause on normal living tissue
through an allergic or photodynamic process a hypersensitivity which becomes evident on re-
application of the same substance and which is designated as such by the Secretary. Before desig-
nating any substance as a strong sensitizer, the Secretary, upon consideration of the frequency
of occurrence and severity of the reaction, shall find that the substance has a significant potential
for causing hypersensitivity." There is a more complete definition of a "strong allergic sensitizer"
in 21 C.F.R. § 191.1(i) (1968).
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sensitivity rather than the product was the sole proximate cause of the
harm. This over-simplified approach was taken whether the case was based
on negligence2 ' or breach of warranty."' Occasionally this view is ex-
pressed by a contemporary writer."'
The difficulty with this approach is that defendant's product as well as
plaintiff's sensitivity is in fact one of the immediate causes of the injury,
assuming harm results from contact with the product." Proof of causa-
tion is not established simply by showing that the plaintiff's illness fol-
lowed the use of defendant's product, where the plaintiff is unable either
to point to any deleterious substance in the product, or to exclude other
possible causes, such as other cosmetics or detergents used by the plaintiff.
So it was stated as to proof of causation in a hair dye case, "[t]he occur-
rence of skin damage is not such proof unless other possible causes are ex-
cluded by competent professional testimony. '
Now that additional knowledge is developing with reference to serious
allergic reactions from various chemicals about which the man on the street
knows nothing, the courts are much less apt to deny flatly liability. They
focus rather on whether the injury threatened is sufficiently widespread,
serious, and predictable so that the producer should take some steps to pro-
tect the consumer. It still is generally accepted, however, that the supplier
need not alter a formula of a product that is safe for a normal user in order
to make it safe for the allergic user or consumer." ' The duty imposed, in
an increasing number of the modern cases, is simply a duty to warn."' This
may arise on negligence grounds, or on strict liability principles, including
breach of express or implied warranty and strict liability in tort. It will be
useful to consider first the supplier's duty to warn under negligence law,
then the extent to which this duty is increased where the case is based on
strict liability. Finally, it can be considered what kind of warning may be
required.
202Wallstrom Optical Co. v. Miller, 59 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
"s'Drake v. Herrman, 261 N.Y. 414, 185 N.E. 685 (1933).
204 See Friedman, Allergy and Products Liability Today, 24 OHIo Sr. L.J. 479, 511 (1963).
o See Comment, Negligence-Liability of Manufacturer or Vendor to an Allergic Consumer,
49 MICH. L. REv. 253, 255 (1950); Note, Legal Aspects of Allergy, 5 VANo. L. Ruv. 212, 223
(1952).2
°SMcGuiness v. Roux Distrib. Co., 19 Misc. 2d 956, 196 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
See also Zampino v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 304, 187 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1959), aff'd
men., 8 N.Y.2d 1069, 170 N.E.2d 415, 207 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1960), where a judgment for plaintiff
in a deodorant case was reversed partly because of insufficient evidence of causation. In another
hair dye case, Fein v. Bonetti, 307 N.Y. 682, 120 N.E.2d 854 (1954), the plaintiff's doctor
testified that the allergic reaction was caused by the defendant's product, but conceded that other
products used by the plaintiff might have caused similar symptoms, and causation was not estab-
lished. In an insecticide case, where there was no testimony as to poisonous ingredients, the court
said, "We think that the liability of a defendant in circumstances such as we have in this case,
must be based upon something more than an assumption that because the plaintiff became ill
following use of the defendant's product, the defendant was negligent in selling a dangerous
substance or product without adequate warning of its lethal character." Scientific Supply Co. v.
Zelinger, 139 Colo. 568, 341 P.2d 897, 898 (1959). In view of these decisions, it is vital for the
defendant to secure a physical examination of the plaintiff to see if the injuries are of a kind
likely to have been caused by defendant's product, as well as to determine the extent of the
injuries.
2°Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying Massachusetts law).
2O See Noel, The Duty To Warn Allergic Users of Products, 12 VANT). L. Rnv. 331 (1959).
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Negligence. No duty to warn allergic users on negligence principles arises
unless defendant knows or should know of the danger. Some decisions state
that the defendant must have actual knowledge of the presence of allergic
reactions,'" but the more recent cases hold the defendant to a duty to warn
of a danger he should know about as an expert, regardless of his actual
knowledge."'
Even where defendant actually knows of the danger there is no duty
to warn unless the product creates risk of harm to a substantial class of
users. Attention will be given to what constitutes a substantial class, but
it is clear that unless plaintiff can establish allergic reactions in a number
of persons besides himself he cannot recover. So in a case involving sun tan
lotion, where the testimony was that only one person in five million was
allergic to the lotion, the court stated that there could be no liability for
negligence where only an "isolated buyer" would be harmed.211
There is indeed one decision, Braun v. Roux Distributing Co.,21 involv-
ing hair dye, which departs from this principle, where the plaintiff suffered
an unusually grave allergic reaction. It was conceded by plaintiff that
"unless the present case is an instance, that there has never been either a
reported or an established case of periarteritis nodosa caused by paraphen-
ylenediamine hair dye."2'' It appeared that ninety per cent of all hair dyes
contain paraphenylenediamine, that there were approximately sixty-five
million applications of hair dye a year, and still no case involving a syste-
mic allergy of the type suffered by the plaintiff had been reported. The
court nevertheless allowed the jury to find a duty to warn against this ex-
tremely remote risk. It is difficult to see how this case can be supported on
negligence principles, when the possibility of harm is balanced against the
utility of the product, even though hair dye may appear to appellate court
judges to have little utility. In fact, even under strict liability principles
a product involving so remote a likelihood of injury, and containing no
primary irritant, would not seem to be defective and unreasonably dan-
214gerous.
How large must the class be, with reference to a particular product
and risk, before the duty to warn arises? A leading case, Wright v. Carter
Products, Inc.,' indicates that the number necessary to create a "substan-
tial" class varies with the gravity of the injury involved, as foreseen by
one with the expert knowledge which the defendant should have as the
"°E.g., Briggs v. National Indus., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949).
1Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying Missouri law);
Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying Massachusetts law); Howard
v. Avon Prods., Inc., 155 Colo. 1444, 395 P.2d 1007 (1964); Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312
S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958). See also Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prod. Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 197, 249
N.Y.S.2d 840, 846 (1964) indicating that liability would have been imposed if the defendant
"knew, or with reasonable diligence should have known" of the presence of a definite class of
allergic users.
' Bonowski v. Revlon, Inc., 251 Iowa 141, 100 N.W.2d 5 (1959).
' 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
213 Id. at 761.
214 W. PROSSERt, TORTS S 96, at 669 (3d ed. 1964); see Noel, supra note 208, at 343. Except
for Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958), the decisions clearly require that
plaintiff establish a class of allergic users.
2 ' 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying Massachusetts law). See also note 195 supra.
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maker of the product, and the feasibility of giving a warning which will
effectively alert the user to the risk. Where the allergy is a common one,
such as the one toward eggs or citrus fruits, there is no duty to warn even
though the class affected is large, since the injury is not serious, and the
person affected ordinarily is aware of his susceptibility."' Even where the
reaction is serious, and one of which the plaintiff has no suspicion, there or-
dinarily is no liability for a rare plaintiff's reaction. So where a sensitizer in
a hair waving preparation caused permanent damage to an optic nerve, a
modern decision found no duty to warn where 500 million sales caused
reported ill effects to only three persons."'7 Earlier decisions find the in-
jury to be isolated even though a considerable proportion of users is
affected, as where a plaintiff denied recovery was disparagingly referred
to as "but one allergic woman out of 1000. ' ' '
Under contemporary standards a substance which severely affects one
out of a thousand might well be regarded as a strong sensitizer, with a re-
sulting duty to warn. Thus a Federal Trade Commission advisory panel
of dermatologists defined a strong sensitizer as one which causes sensitiza-
tion in one or more persons in 10,000 population or a lesser proportion
if the sensitization is severe."' A much smaller percentage of allergic re-
actions was involved in Wright v. Carter Products, Inc.," where during
the four-year period prior to plaintiff's injuries the defendant sold eighty-
two million jars of its deodorant and received only 373 complaints. Still
the court set aside a finding that there was no duty to warn, stating that
reliance had been placed too exclusively on solely quantitative standards
and statistical analysis, with insufficient attention to the gravity of the in-
juries, the foreseeability of these injuries by the plaintiff, and "the difficul-
ty, if any, of embodying an effective precaution in the labels or literature
attached to the product."'"' While the opinion does not definitely find a
duty to warn, its general tone is sufficiently favorable to the plaintiff to
assist a favorable settlement. A subsequent deodorant case found no duty to
warn where only four complaints occurred in a year in which there were
six hundred thousand sales of the defendant's product."' Here the per-
centage of complaints was larger than in Wright v. Carter Products, Inc.,
but still less than one out of a hundred thousand.
'While uncertainty remains as to how large a class must be before a duty
to warn arises under negligence law, the size of the needed class, assuming
an injury of given seriousness, is declining, although there still are many
2" See W. PRossrit, TORTS § 96, at 669 (3d ed. 1964); James, The Untoward Effects of Ciga-
rettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550, 15 52 (1966).
"' Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956). See also Walstrom Optical
Co. v. Miller, 59 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), denying any duty to warn where the aller-
gic reaction was "most unusual," with no indication of other complaints.
218Bennett v. Pilot Prods. Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951).
.' See Freedman, Allergy and Products Liability Today, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 507 n.102(1963), referring to Food Chemical News, August 7, 1961, as the source for this information,
and commenting on the difficulty of determining whether or not a particular sensitizer comes
within this definition.
20244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying Massachusetts law).
"' Id. at 59.




negligence cases where a duty to warn has not been established."'5 In estab-
lishing a class, plaintiff will of course attempt to secure disclosure of other
complaints after use of defendant's product. The defendant will attempt
to restrict any disclosure order to cases involving the product while it had
the exact same formula, and was used under similar conditions." Evidence
of the number of prior injuries may be limited to showing notice of the
danger," and defendant may then insist that discovery be limited to com-
plaints prior to the date of the plaintiff's purchase. While disclosure may
be allowed without difficulty under federal discovery rules, some state
courts are reluctant to order the defendant to furnish the names of all
persons who have complained of earlier injuries."
Strict Liability. Strict liability for allergic injury may be based on breach
of warranty or on the principles in the Restatement. '2 A further liability,
in substance a strict one, since ordinarily no proof of actual negligence is
required, may be established by showing violation of the labeling require-
ments of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act" s or of the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act,2 1 or comparable state statutes. In recent years
plaintiffs have turned to one or more of these remedies to avoid the bur-
den of proving negligence. Except in the case of an express warranty,
however, the plaintiff's burden may not be much eased, for he still must
show that a substantial or appreciable class of allergic users or consumers
is affected by the product.
Sometimes the defendant is confident enough of his product to express-
ly state it contains only "non injurious" materials. In this situation it has
been held, with reference to a dress, that there was a breach of an express
warranty even though the dress might not be harmful to any other users."'
The court observed "[t]he question is not whether the garment contained
substances harmful to the skin of any wearer of it. The warranty is ex-
press. Cases in which the action is based on implied warranty of fitness
or suitability with resulting injury to an allergic or idiosyncratical person
are not in point. ... Thus the defendant may incur an unusually strict
122 Bish v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 236 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1956) (applying Louisiana
law); Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956) (applying Oklahoma law);
Briggs v. National Indus., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949); Howard v. Avon
Prods., Inc., 155 Colo. 444, 395 P.2d 1007 (1964); Mogensen v. Hicks, 253 Iowa 139, 110
N.W.2d 563 (1961); Bonowski v. Revlon, Inc., 251 Iowa 141, 100 N.W.2d 5 (1959); Moran
v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 146 So. 2d 4 (La. App. 1962); Gould v. Slater Woolen Co., 147
Mass. 315, 17 N.E. 531 (1888); Cleary v. John M. Maris Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N.Y.S.2d 38
(Sup. Ct. 1940); Walstrom Optical Co. v. Miller, 59 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
224 Freedman, Allergy and Products Liability Today, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 511 (1963).
2.. See Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958).
221 Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d 157, 268 P.2d 199 (1954).
But see Bleacher v. Bristol-Myers Co., 53 Del. 1, 163 A.2d 526 (Super. Ct. 1960).
2272 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
228 See note 183 supra.
229 See note 184 supra.
"
40McLachlan v. Wilmington Dry Goods Co., 41 Del. 378, 22 A.2d 851 (1941).
22' 22 A.2d at 853. Likewise in a case involving an express warranty that an insecticide was
"not poisonous to human beings," it was enough for the plaintiff to show the product was poison-
ous to him, though it may not have been so to other users. Simpson v. American Oil Co., 219
N.C. 595, 14 S.E.2d 638 (1941).
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liability to an allergic plaintiff where an express warranty is involved, and
apparently need not establish that a substantial class of allergic users would
be affected."' 2
Where breach of the implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness
for use is asserted, it is necessary, as in a negligence case, to establish a sub-
stantial or appreciable class of allergic users. 3 If the product can be used
by a normal person without injury, ordinarily there is no breach of the
warranty. Where, however, the plaintiff can show that a substantial class
is affected, he can establish breach of an implied warranty. It has been
suggested that for a breach of implied warranty the class must amount to
at least five or ten per cent of the population.2 " Actually while many plain-
tiffs have been unsuccessful in warranty cases in establishing that a sub-
stantial class is affected,23 there are a number of recent implied warranty
decisions where recovery has been allowed without the plaintiff having es-
tablished that the affected class amounted to a specific percentage. In Bi-
anchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., ° involving aniline dyes in face powder,
the plaintiff was allowed to recover after showing that "some" users were
affected although the class of such users was not defined as to numbers or
percentage. The court stated, "[w]e do not think that a seller of face pow-
der containing a known irritant to 'some' persons' skins can be heard to say
that he is not liable for breach of implied warranty of fitness where injury
results from the use of the powder by one such as is described by the evi-
dence in the case at bar." '37 Likewise, in Reynolds v. Sunray Drug Co.,"
involving allergic injuries from the defendant's lipstick, the court upheld
liability although "only a small proportion of those who use a certain
article are injuriously affected thereby."3 " In Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores,
Inc.,"'4 involving injury from an analine derivative in a hat band, the
court said, "the mere fact that only a small proportion of those who use a
certain article would suffer injuries by reason of such use does not absolve
232 See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 29.03 (2).
233 Zager v. F.W. Woolworth, 30 Cal. App. 2d 324, 86 P.2d 389 (1939); Stanton v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 312 Ill. App. 496, 38 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Noel, supra note 208, at 344.
2s4 See Horowitz, Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in Actions Based upon Breach of Implied
Warranty of Quality, 24 S. CAL. L. REv. 221, 226-27 (1951).
" In the following cases the plaintiff failed to recover on warranty grounds: Grau v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 324 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Alabama law); Merrill v. Beaute Vues
Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956) (applying Oklahoma law); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963); Zager v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 30 Cal.
App. 2d 324, 86 P.2d 389 (1939); Howard v. Avon Prods., Inc., 155 Colo. 444, 395 P.2d 1007
(1964); Corneliuson v. Arthur Drug Stores, Inc., 153 Conn. 134, 214 A.2d 676 (1965); Stanton v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 Ill. App. 496, 38 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Bonowski v. Revlon, Inc., 251 Iowa
141, 100 N.W.2d 5 (1959); Moran v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 146 So. 2d 4 (La. App.
1963); Cassagrande v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 340 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109 (1960); Longo v.
Touraine Stores, Inc., 319 Mass. 727, 66 N.E. 792 (1946); Bradt v. Holloway, 242 Mass. 446,
136 N.E. 254 (1922); Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell & Brum Co., 136 Me. 118, 3 A.2d 650 (1939);
Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 197, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1964); Zampino
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 304, 187 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 1069,
170 N.E.2d 415 (1960); Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955); Bar-
rett v. S.S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941).
23 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939).
23 19 N.E.2d at 699.
228 135 N.J.L. 475, 52 A.2d 666 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947).
" 52 A.2d at 667.
240 122 N.J.L. 29, 4 A.2d 73 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939).
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the vendor from liability under the implied warranty." 1 The court in
Cassagrande v. F.W. Woolworth Co." declined to pass on whether one
allergic user in 2,000, if that percentage had been firmly established, would
constitute the "significant number" there required. In Esborg v. Bailey
Drug Co., involving hair tint, the court said that what constitutes an
"appreciable class ... of users is incapable of precise or quantitative defi-
nition,""M and left this to the trier of fact with instructions to bear in
mind "the usual and ordinary accepted meaning of the words employed."'
Doubtless the meaning of the words, "appreciable class" would and should
vary considerably with the gravity of the injury involved.
In the implied warranty cases thus far considered there were no warn-
ings and no instructions for the taking of a patch test. In Crotty v. Shar-
tenberg's New Haven, Inc.' the defendant, besides warning of the possi-
bility of allergic injury, gave instructions for a patch test, but the test was
ineffective. The court held that plaintiff could recover by showing that
"the product contains a substance or ingredient which has a tendency to
affect injuriously an appreciable number of people, though fewer in num-
ber than the number of normal buyers."'' Apparently this means that
plaintiff must show that an appreciable number of those who receive a
negative result on the recommended patch test are affected."B
Since it is necessary to show in an implied warranty case, as in one based
on negligence, a substantial or appreciable class, the process of determin-
ing whether the class is large enough to create a duty to warn probably
should be similar in each type of case. In Howard v. Avon Products, Inc.,'
where recovery was sought on both negligence and warranty counts, the
court in finding that a substantial class was not affected did not seem to
differentiate between the two counts. In a negligence case, as has been
shown, there must be consideration not only of percentages but of the
gravity of the injury, and of the ease with which an effective warning can
be given. 5' Assuming these factors also apply in a warranty case, the only
difference as to proof in a warranty case is that the plaintiff need not estab-
lish negligence, and, in that connection, it would seem that the plaintiff
need not show that the defendant knew or should have known of the
existence of the substantial class. It should be enough that such a class in
fact exists, for knowledge of the seller is not ordinarily essential for war-
ranty liability."M The state of the seller's knowledge is not relevant for the
24 4 A.2d at 75.
2423 4 0 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109 (1960).
24361 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963).
244 378 P.2d at 304-05.
245 Id. at 305.
241 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960).
247 162 A.2d at 516.
248 This interpretation is borne out by a later decision that there is no breach of warranty
when "due and ample warning of any harmful and deleterious ingredient" is given. Hamon v.
Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961).
249 155 Co. 444, 395 P.2d 1007 (1964).
250 See note 215 supra.
251Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960).
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"inquiry into scienter is here an inquiry into negligence, and liability for
a breach of warranty is strict.""2 s
There is a Texas case, however, Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc.,s
where a user of the drug MER/29 was denied recovery on grounds of im-
plied warranty, for an injury, found by the jury to be an allergic reaction,
when it also was found that at the time the plaintiff suffered injury, it was
scientifically unknowable that the drug would cause cataracts in an ap-
preciable class of persons. The opinion, assuming the truth of this finding,
takes the position that at least in the case of a drug there is no liability for
breach of an implied warranty unless the harmful results "ought reason-
ably to have been foreseen by a person of ordinary care in an appreciable
number of persons.".2 . Likewise, in a Washington case it was stated that
before recovery there must be a finding that a specific ingredient in the
hair tint involved was harmful to a "reasonably foreseeable and appreci-
able class or number of potential users of the product. 255 It has been said
in this connection that, "while knowledge of danger is not ordinarily a
prerequisite to liability for breach of warranty, the cases in this area [aller-
gy] seem to stress the lack of such knowledge on the part of the supplier."'
One writer suggests it is only in the case of cosmetics that the allergic
plaintiff can recover, in many jurisdictions, simply by showing that an
appreciable class is affected, and that foreseeability should be required in
drug cases, where an allergic reaction or side effect is involved, as in the
Cudmore case. 57 In support of this, it is urged that production of new
drugs will be discouraged if, as an Oregon court puts it, the price of drugs
must "include an amount sufficient to create a fund to compensate those
who suffer unanticipated harm from the use of a beneficial drug.""25 On
the other hand it must be considered whether imposition of liability will
reduce injuries by inducing manufacturers to expand their research as to
possible allergic injuries or side effects. The inability of the person injured
by an unpredictable allergic reaction, or side effect, to administer the risk
himself should also be taken into account.
Where strict liability is asserted under the Restatement,"' it still is neces-
sary, as in an implied warranty case, to show the presence of a substantial
or appreciable class of allergic users or consumers. So it is said that where
the product contains an ingredient to which "a substantial number of the
population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not gen-
erally known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably
2522 HARPER & JAMES § 28.20, at 1581; see, however, Howard v. Avon Prods., Inc., 155 Colo.
444, 395 P.2d 1007 (1964), where the court discusses the defendant's lack of knowledge or ability
to know in finding "no reasonably foreseeable class" of allergic users in connection with the war-
ranty count.
" 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. n.r.e., cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
254 Id. at 643.
us Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 347, 378 P.2d 298, 304-05 (1963).25 See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 29.03 (1).
'7"See Keeton, Some Observations about Strict Liability of the Maker of Prescription Drugs:
the Aftermath of Mer/29, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 149, 154-55 (1968).
"S'Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Ore. 89, 95-96, 409 P.2d 904, 907 (1966).
2592 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965).
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not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning
1120
against it ....
It would seem that since this section of the Restatement imposes liabil-
ity without proof of negligence, it should not be necessary to show more
than that the product is "in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous"" 1 by reason of a risk to a substantial class of allergic users. A com-
ment goes on to say, however, that in the allergy situation the duty to
warn arises only where the seller "has knowledge or by the application of
reasonably developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge,
of the presence of the ingredient and the danger." 2" Under this view the
liability imposed by the Restatement in the allergy situation is not in fact
very strict, and resembles negligence liability more than it does strict liabil-
ity based on breach of warranty. It may be, however, that the courts will
decide not to follow this particular comment, which seems to conflict with
the basic provision of the Restatement imposing liability for defective and
unreasonably dangerous products even though "the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.""
As indicated earlier, consumer protection statutes such as the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Hazardous Substances Act 24
now protect against sensitizers which produce allergic reactions. Where
plaintiff can establish that he has been harmed by what the court finds to
be a "strong sensitizer" within the meaning of the statute, and as speci-
fied in regulations thereunder, or that the labeling and warning provisions
of the statute involved have not been observed, he has established a viola-
tion of the Act. This ordinarily is negligence per se, or at least is evidence
of negligence."'
Nature of Warning. Courts requiring a warning to allergic users of a
product give little indication of what kind of warning should be given.
Where a preliminary patch test is an effective means of determining
whether a person is allergic to the product, it is clear that directions
should be given for taking the needed test.
2
"
Where, as in the case of a deodorant, there may be no practical way of
testing to determine whether a person is allergic to the product, what sort
of warning should be given? In Wright v. Carter Products, Inc."' it was
indicated that the statement "Safe for Normal Skin" might well be in-
sufficient as a warning. Apparently the court considered it would be help-
ful to warn specifically of the possibility of allergic reactions, and to name
the sensitizer contained in the product.
It has been suggested that this kind of warning would not aid those
260 Id. § 402A, comment j.
261 Id. § 402A.
262 Id. § 402A, and comment j.
26
3 See id. § 402A(2) (a).
204 See notes 183, 184 supra, and accompanying text.
265 See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 35, at 202 (3d ed. 1964); Comment, Products Liability Based on
Violation of Statutory Standards, 64 MicH. L. Ruv. 1388 (1966).
2
. See Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (1957).
207244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying Massachusetts law), discussed at note 215 supra.
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who, unknown to themselves, might have an allergy to the named sensi-
tizer.' Such a warning would, however, be useful to those who know
they are allergic to the named sensitizer, and even where such knowledge
is lacking, the warning of a possible allergic reaction would help those who
apprehend such reactions and avoid known sensitizers. Even though a
person has no apprehension of allergic reactions, and goes ahead and uses
the product to his detriment, a warning of the risk of allergic reactions
may lead him immediately to discontinue use of the product after a rash
appears, and promptly seek medical aid to lessen the severity or duration of
the reaction.
Where the sensitizer comes within the scope of the Federal Pure Food
and Drug Act, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, or other legislation
to protect consumers, the labeling and warning precautions, including
those for preliminary tests, must of course conform to any requirements
laid down in the statute or regulations. The giving of such warnings and
instructions will not always protect the defendant, however, since more
adequate instructions or warnings may be required in a particular juris-
diction under common law principles."'
It is evident that the duty to give warnings and directions for use is
expanding and may arise not only under negligence principles, but in
strict liability cases. The duty may extend to unusual but foreseeable uses
of the product, and to unrepresentative users, such as those allergic to the
product. With the growing concern for consumer protection, and the in-
creasing number of suits based on injury from defective products, doubt-
less the courts will continue to enlarge the areas where a duty to warn or
instruct arises, and indicate with increased precision what constitutes an
adequate warning or direction for use in particular situations.
:"
8See Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prod. Corp., 21 App. Div. 197, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1964).
289 See notes 23, 173-77 supra.
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